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A PATH TO DATA-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT
Jacob T. Elberg*
Abstract
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has a long-stated goal of
encouraging companies to engage in what the author refers to as
“compliant behaviors”—maintenance of an effective pre-existing
compliance program, post-enforcement adoption of an effective
compliance program, cooperation with a government investigation, and
self-disclosure of misconduct. Substantial DOJ guidance over the past two
decades, along with the concrete incentive structure of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, have increasingly made clear to organizations
when and how such behaviors will be rewarded in criminal matters.
Recently, DOJ has made transparency and clarity regarding the benefit of
compliant behaviors a priority in calculating and announcing criminal
resolutions. With respect to civil False Claims Act (“FCA”) settlements,
however, meaningful formal DOJ guidance on the effect of compliant
behavior only arrived in 2019. More significantly, DOJ’s treatment of
compliant behavior in civil cases, in contrast to that in the case of criminal
resolutions, has appeared inconsistent and certainly opaque. This lack of
clear implementation philosophy is particularly problematic in the area of
health care, an industry for which the FCA is the primary tool for
government action in response to misconduct. While much has been
written on the systemic efficiencies—or lack thereof—that DOJ’s
enforcement practices bring to the activities of regulated industries, this
is the first article to use data to ask whether DOJ has a governing practice
concerning civil settlements, or whether instead, its settlement practices
fail to match its stated principles.
For decades, even as resources devoted to health care compliance by
market participants have skyrocketed and DOJ has pressed corporate
entities to engage in compliant behaviors, the health care industry and the
defense bar have expressed skepticism regarding the actual payoff they
might realize by engaging in those behaviors. DOJ’s response has been a
*
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series of public statements amounting to, “trust us, they matter.” Until
now, the health care industry has been without any mechanism to test those
assurances.
In response to changes in the tax code, however, DOJ made
adjustments in 2018 to its practice of disclosing information regarding
FCA settlements—changes that have shaken loose data that provides an
opportunity to test DOJ’s claims of rewarding compliant behaviors in civil
cases. The author is the first and thus far the only person to have identified
and analyzed this newly available data. Examination of this data
demonstrates that wide-ranging, structural changes are necessary. The
data raises substantial questions about: the quantum of credit given for
cooperation; conduct DOJ values in resolving FCA cases; and the degree
of consistency in cases settled by U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the
country. For example, analysis of the data reveals inconsistent benefits for
cooperation. Cases where defendants self-disclosed misconduct or
cooperated were often not treated more leniently than cases where
defendants did not self-disclose or cooperate, and a review of more than
100 settlements did not find a single instance in which DOJ purported to
give an entity a reduction based on its pre-existing compliance program.
At the same time, DOJ appears to be greatly rewarding defendants for
agreeing to settle—highlighting concerns both with regard to whether
DOJ is achieving adequate deterrence and with regard to whether the
FCA’s potential penalties are coercing settlements. And the data appears
to show significant variation in settlement positions depending on the
identity of enforcing DOJ component, with cases handled by DOJ’s Civil
Division in Washington, D.C. treated more leniently than cases handled
solely by U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country.
With the data now public—and at a moment in time when DOJ is
emphasizing transparency and clarity in rewarding compliant behaviors
in the resolution of criminal cases—DOJ’s corporate health care
enforcement regime is at a crossroads. Without change in this area, DOJ
risks undercutting its efforts at encouraging compliant behaviors in one of
DOJ’s primary enforcement areas. No longer left in the dark about the
impact of compliant behaviors in calculating FCA resolutions, the health
care industry may be less likely to continue investing in compliance
programs at the same rate, to cooperate with government investigations,
and especially to self-disclose misconduct to the government. The analysis
reveals that a detailed structure of DOJ’s calculations in FCA settlements,
with calculations transparent in each FCA resolution, is needed to
accomplish DOJ’s goal of encouraging cooperation and investment in
compliance programs, as well as to provide an assurance that like cases
are treated alike.
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INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has long stated its desire to incentivize
companies to engage in what I refer to as “compliant behaviors”—having an
effective pre-existing compliance program, adopting an effective compliance
program as a remedial measure, cooperating with a government investigation, and
self-disclosing misconduct to the government. Scholars have raised questions as to
the effectiveness and costs of rewarding compliant behaviors, and some have argued
DOJ should cease its efforts to reward compliant behaviors.1 This Article does not
weigh into that debate, and instead addresses the current state of enforcement.
Whether right or wrong to do so, DOJ has decided that compliant behaviors are
beneficial and should be rewarded. When it comes to the handling of criminal
investigations and prosecutions, substantial DOJ guidance over the past two
decades, alongside the concrete incentive structure of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, have increasingly made clear to organizations when and how such
behaviors will be rewarded. When it comes to the impact of compliant behaviors on
the resolution of civil False Claims Act (“FCA”) settlements, however, meaningful
DOJ guidance only arrived in 2019, and it still lacks a clear incentive structure. This
is particularly problematic in the area of health care, an industry for which the FCA
is the primary tool for government action in response to corporate misconduct.
Until recently, the lack of a visible structure for resolution of civil cases was
masked by the fact that the system required no transparency from DOJ as to the
bases for its FCA resolutions.2 In 2018, however, that changed, forcing DOJ to give
a glimpse behind the curtain. Because a change in the tax law now required DOJ to
begin revealing what portion of resolutions constitutes restitution and what portion
constitutes additional punishment beyond paying restitution, the law effectively
requires DOJ to reveal how harshly each act of corporate misconduct is treated. This
Article analyzes more than 115 corporate health care FCA settlements between
February 2018 (when DOJ began including the restitution information in FCA

1

See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997) (examining
various regimes for punishing corporate defendants, including that of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, and concluding that they do not “adequately create proper incentives
for companies to monitor, investigate, and report employee wrongdoing”); Sean J. Griffith,
Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2127
(2016) (arguing that government should reduce investigation costs by requiring companies
to install compliance functions and that “government enforcement agents have structural
incentives to mandate excessive compliance” (citing Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing
Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 991–99) (2009)); Miriam Hechler Baer,
Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 903, 905–10 (2011) (exploring the costs and
benefits of cooperation credit in cases involving individuals).
2
See Amendment of 1986 Code, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13306, 131 Stat. 2054, 2126–28
(2017) (requiring DOJ to provide, for the first time, information regarding the portion of civil
settlement agreements which constitute restitution).
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agreements) and June 2019—an analysis of particular salience given DOJ’s May
2019 guidance regarding benefits for compliant behaviors in FCA cases.
Based on this analysis, detailed below, there is reason for skepticism that DOJ
is valuing compliant behaviors in the way it claims and that DOJ utilizes any
consistent framework in resolving FCA cases. Examination of data reveals a lack of
uniformity in resolving FCA cases across different DOJ components and an absence
of evidence that DOJ rewards compliant behaviors. Instead, the resolutions
demonstrate that DOJ, while failing to reward compliant behaviors, has routinely
discounted penalties without explanation and to a far greater extent than is seen in
criminal resolutions in exchange for defendants’ agreement to settle.
The reality exposed by the forced transparency resulting from the tax law
change seems to stand in stark contrast to DOJ’s May 2019 FCA guidance. This gap
is more notable because it comes in the midst of a sustained and well-publicized
effort by DOJ’s Criminal Division to provide true transparency as to the impact of
compliant behaviors – in particular, cooperation and self-disclosure. With industry
and the defense bar increasingly expecting proof from DOJ, and the limited FCA
data now available providing fuel for those skeptical of DOJ’s assurances, DOJ’s
corporate health care enforcement is at a crossroads, creating a pressing need for a
rethinking of DOJ policy in this critical area.
I. GUIDANCE RE: IMPACT OF COMPLIANT BEHAVIORS IN CRIMINAL RESOLUTIONS
In criminal cases, there is substantial guidance and transparency as to the
impact of compliant behaviors both from within DOJ and through the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. In fact, it is primarily through that DOJ-generated, criminalfocused guidance that the government has made clear it views compliant behaviors
as significant in the fight against fraud and believes that the way to encourage
compliant behaviors is to take them into account in determining the appropriate
outcome when fraud is uncovered.
A. Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
Most significantly, the Justice Manual (“JM”)3—a publicly available resource
containing DOJ policies and procedures—makes clear that compliant behavior
should be a significant factor in determining whether and in what form to bring a
criminal prosecution against a business organization. The Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations4 were added to the JM following the
3
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/justicemanual [https://perma.cc/ZLG8-LPP9] (“The JM was previously known as the United States
Attorneys’ Manual (USAM). It was comprehensively revised and renamed in 2018.”). For
simplicity, this Article refers to the document as the “JM,” even when referring to time
periods when it was known as the “USAM.”
4
Id. § 9-28.000 (2008) [hereinafter Corporate Prosecution Principles], https://www.
justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations

2020]

HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT

1173

publication of an August 2008 memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Mark
Filip5, which also updated the Corporate Prosecution Principles. The Corporate
Prosecution Principles describe the factors criminal prosecutors should consider
when investigating a corporate entity and making determinations regarding whether
to bring charges and when negotiating potential resolutions. The Corporate
Prosecution Principles regularly mark the framework for presentations by defense
counsel to prosecutors and for internal memoranda by DOJ prosecutors seeking
approval to charge or resolve cases.
The Corporate Prosecution Principles section of the JM notes that “the
prosecutor must weigh all of the factors normally considered in the sound exercise
of prosecutorial judgment: the sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success
at trial; the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction;
and the adequacy of noncriminal approaches,” but that there are additional factors
present when considering business organizations.6 The section goes on to list eleven
factors:
1.

the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm
to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing
the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of crime;

2.

the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including
the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management;

3.

the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, including prior
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;

4.

the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents;

5.

the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing
compliance program;

[https://perma.cc/BHY8-ZAMB].
5
Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Principles
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GZE-52EL]. The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations are commonly referred to as the “Filip Factors”—an ironic development,
given that the Filip Memo noted that his revision of the prior Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations “was truly a collective effort,” and “should not bear
the name of any particular individual at the Department, as prior iterations sometimes
became known,” lest they be read to “imply[] that Department policy is subject to revision
with every changing of the guard.” Id. at 2.
6
Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 4, § 9-28.300(A).
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6.

the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing;

7.

the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to improve
an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline or
terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the
relevant government agencies;

8.

collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate
harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not
proven personally culpable, as well as the impact on the public
arising from the prosecution;

9.

the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement
actions;

10. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation’s malfeasance; and
11. the interests of any victims.7
Of the eleven Corporate Prosecution Principles, four aim squarely at rewarding
compliant behaviors: “the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation
of its agents,” “the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing
compliance program,” “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing,” and the corporation’s remedial efforts “to implement an effective
compliance program or to improve an existing one.”8
Originally issued more than 20 years ago—in June 1999 through a
memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder—the Corporate
Prosecution Principles have, through numerous iterations, generally listed the same
factors in place today.9 The Holder Memo instructed prosecutors to consider each of
the four compliant behaviors, as did later iterations issued by Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson in 2003, by Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty
in 2006, the Filip Memo in 2008, and another iteration issued by Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quillian Yates in 2015 in the context of DOJ’s efforts to increase
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.”10
7

Id.; see also id. §§ 9-28.400–9-28.1300.
Id. § 9-28.300; see also id. §§ 9-28.700, 9-28.800, 9-28.900, 9-28.1000.
9
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Bringing
Criminal Charges Against Corporations to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys (June
16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://perma.cc/K2CY-E3XJ].
10
Id.; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Dep’t
8
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The changes from the Holder Memo through today centered around DOJ’s
expectations for cooperation, with each iteration making adjustments to the
cooperation factor while retaining all four compliant behaviors.11
Components & U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo],
https://web.archive.org/web/20030403065859/http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_org
anizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6Q5-JYZG]; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
McNulty Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnult
y_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DE9-CM2P]; Filip Memo, supra note 5; Memorandum from
Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on Individual Accountability
for Corporate Wrongdoing to Assistant Att’ys Gen., Dirs., & U.S. Att’ys (Sept. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Yates Memo], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download.
[https://perma.cc/JWS6-7WQG]. The Holder Memo listed eight principles for consideration.
Principle 10 was added in 2003, and in 2015 the two related factors addressing cooperation
—“the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,” and “the
corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing”—were broken out into two
separate principles, after having been combined into a single principle in prior versions of
the Corporate Prosecution Principles. Salley Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Just., Remarks at American Banking Association and American Bar Association Money
Laundering Enforcement Conference (Nov. 16, 2015), in JUST. NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-deliversremarks-american-banking-0 [https://perma.cc/QYX6-MZCW].
11
The Holder Memo and Thompson Memo directed prosecutors to take into account
whether the entity under investigation waived the attorney-client privilege and/or advanced
legal fees to employees who had engaged in misconduct. DOJ’s consideration in evaluating
cooperation of entities’ decisions regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege and regarding
advancing fees to employees generated substantial controversy, and eventually a federal
district court decision holding that prosecutors had violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights of employees by causing their employer, KPMG, to condition payment of their legal
fees on their willingness to be interviewed by the government. See United States v. Stein,
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other grounds, 541 F.3d 130, 136
(2d Cir. 2008). Also in 2006, the Senate considered the Attorney Client Privilege Protection
Act of 2006, which sought to prevent prosecutors from considering the waiver of attorneyclient privilege in making charging decisions. S. 30, 109th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2006). Although
the proposed bill was not passed by the Senate, the McNulty Memo soon followed,
instructing prosecutors that they could seek privileged information only “when there is a
legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law enforcement obligations.”
McNulty Memo, supra note 10. The McNulty Memo reaffirmed the four compliant
behaviors as factors to be considered, and again focused on cooperation in revising the
Corporate Prosecution Principles. Id. The Filip Memo for a third time amended the Corporate
Prosecution Principles to make adjustments to the cooperation factor. Filip Memo, supra
note 5. The Filip Memo again retained all four compliant behaviors, while focusing its
amendments on cooperation and removing consideration of privilege waiver and legal fee
advancement from the cooperation analysis in making charging decisions. Id.; see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud
Section (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download
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B. Additional DOJ Guidance re: Compliant Behaviors
In recent years, DOJ has only increased its public emphasis on compliant
behaviors and statements tying compliant behaviors to increased DOJ leniency.
Through numerous statements and issuance of guidance, DOJ has sought to
incentivize companies to engage in compliant behaviors by providing guidance to
industry as to how DOJ would 1) evaluate and reward investment in compliance
programs; and 2) evaluate and reward cooperation and self-disclosure. DOJ has
emphasized its belief in the impact of transparency:
Transparency about the types of corporate practices and programs
that the Department of Justice values has the . . . benefit of reinforcing
real-world outcomes that we desire as an institution. By demystifying the
considerations commonly confronted by white-collar prosecutors, our
hope is that companies will have the information and security they need to
invest fully in compliance on the front end, and to make good decisions in
the face of misconduct on the back end.12
As to corporate compliance programs, DOJ has taken a number of steps to send
the message to industries that evaluating compliance programs—to determine
whether and how much reward should be given—is a priority for DOJ. In November
2015, DOJ announced that the Fraud Section of DOJ’s Criminal Division retained a
full-time compliance expert to aid DOJ’s evaluation of compliant behavior to inform
criminal prosecution decisions.13 While DOJ announced the elimination of the
[https://perma.cc/5QVY-A3ES]. The Filip Memo noted its “principal revisions . . .
concern[ed] what measures a business entity must take to qualify for the long-recognized
‘cooperation’ mitigating factor, as well as how payment of attorneys’ fees by a business
organization for its officers or employees, or participation in a joint defense or similar
agreement, will be considered in the prosecutive analysis. Much of the remainder of the
[Corporate Prosecution] Principles [were left] unchanged.” Filip Memo, supra note 5.
12
Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the
Global Investigations Review Live New York (Oct. 8, 2019), in JUST. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter Global Investigations Review Live], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assist
ant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-delivers-remarks-global-investigations [https://per
ma.cc/2ANT-Y297].
13
U.S. Dep’t of Just., New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained, supra note 11
(“Among her duties as a consulting expert, [Hui] Chen will provide expert guidance to Fraud
Section prosecutors as they consider the enumerated factors in the United States Attorneys’
Manual concerning the prosecution of business entities, including the existence and
effectiveness of any compliance program that a company had in place at the time of the
conduct giving rise to the prospect of criminal charges, and whether the corporation has taken
meaningful remedial action, such as the implementation of new compliance measures to
detect and prevent future wrongdoing. Chen will help prosecutors develop appropriate
benchmarks for evaluating corporate compliance and remediation measures and
communicating with stakeholders in setting those benchmarks.”).

2020]

HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT

1177

position in October 2018, DOJ simultaneously announced a program to create “a
workforce better steeped in compliance issues across the board,” through a
“combination of diverse hiring and the development of targeted training
programs.”14 In February 2017, DOJ’s Criminal Division published guidance as to
what DOJ looks for in evaluating corporate compliance programs and then published
an updated version of that guidance in April 2019, and then again in June 2020.15
While the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs noted that many of its
topics also appear in the JM, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, or other sources, its
publication represented another clear attempt on the criminal side to increase
guidance and transparency to encourage compliant behavior.
DOJ guidance has been perhaps even more prevalent when it comes to the
standards and benefits regarding cooperation and self-disclosure. In addition to the
repeated adjustments to the Corporate Prosecution Principles described above, DOJ
has issued supplementary guidance. The Yates Memo identified six steps DOJ
would take to “strengthen [DOJ’s] pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing,” the
first of which focused on detailing under what circumstances corporations can
qualify for cooperation credit under the Corporate Prosecution Principles.16
As it has focused on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) matters, DOJ has
formalized additional incentives to engage in compliant behavior, focusing on
cooperation and self-disclosure, while also reinforcing DOJ’s commitment to
rewarding remedial investments in compliance programs. In an effort to increase
transparency regarding the benefits of cooperation and self-disclosure even beyond
that flowing from the Corporate Prosecution Principles, described above, and U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines guidance, detailed below (both of which, of course, apply
with equal force to FCPA maters), DOJ supplemented the JM with the FCPA
Resource Guide in 2012 (published in collaboration with the SEC).17 It also created
the FCPA Pilot Program in 2016, and then formalized the FCPA Pilot Program into
the Corporate Enforcement Policy, also inserting it into the JM in 2018, all with an
eye towards incentivizing compliant behavior through increased guidance and
transparency. 18
14
Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at NYU
School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on
Achieving Effective Compliance (Oct. 12, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2018)
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brian-benczkowski-deliversremarks-nyu-school-law-program [https://perma.cc/P2GB-AD4X].
15
See CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS (2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download
[https://perma.cc/Z2RH-WY9P].
16
Yates Memo, supra note 10.
17
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFR9-8AB8].
18
Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at 34th International
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) in JUST. NEWS (Nov. 29,
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Under the Corporate Enforcement Policy (which DOJ announced in 2018
would be binding as to FCPA matters and used as “nonbinding guidance” by the
Criminal Division in other areas of white-collar enforcement beyond the FCPA),19
companies who voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate, and appropriately
institute remedial measures, will presumptively receive a declination of prosecution,
absent aggravating circumstances involving the seriousness of the offense or the
nature of the offender.20 Even where a criminal resolution is warranted for a
company that makes a voluntary self-disclosure, DOJ will apply the FCPA
Corporate Enforcement Policy and agree to or recommend to a sentencing court a
50% reduction off of the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range, and
generally will not require the appointment of an outside monitor.21 Where the
company does not make a self-disclosure but does cooperate and appropriately
remediate, DOJ will support up to a 25% reduction off of the low end of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines fine range.22 Notably, as detailed below, these deductions are
in addition to the already substantial role compliant behaviors play in calculating the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range.
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-deliversremarks-34th-international-conference-foreign [https://perma.cc/SFX3-BU97] (“We expect
the new policy to reassure corporations that want to do the right thing. It will increase the
volume of voluntary disclosures, and enhance our ability to identify and punish culpable
individuals. . . . We want corporate officers and board members to better understand the costs
and benefits of cooperation.”).
While operating outside of DOJ, the SEC has similarly sought to provide guidance that
compliant behavior will be rewarded. The SEC has done this through a report (commonly
referred to as the Seaboard Report) in 2001, which sought to explicitly detail its methodology
for determining penalties, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION
STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENOFORCEMENT
DECISIONS (2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma
.cc/L6MF-LLY7]; a statement commonly referred to as the Penalties Statement in 2006, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE SEC CONCERNING FINANCIAL PENALTIES
(2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [https://perma.cc/GSL5-JH9K]; a
cooperation initiative in 2010, which among other things made the Seaboard Report part of
the SEC Enforcement Manual, Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces
Initiative to Encourage Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations
(Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm [https://perma.cc/N3MX
-ZFFW]; as well as publication of the FCPA Resource Guide in 2012. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
& U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 17.
19
John P. Cronan, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at Practising Law
Institute Event (Nov. 28, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-john-p-cronan-delivers-remarkspractising-law [https://perma.cc/Z89T-Q7BE].
20
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-47.120(1) (2019), https://www.justice.gov
/jm/jm-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977 [https://perma.cc/83SR-R5KJ].
21
Id.
22
Id. § 9-47.120(2).
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In addition to referencing the Corporate Prosecution Principles, the Corporate
Enforcement Policy provides additional, detailed guidance regarding what
constitutes self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.23 The defense bar has
understandably viewed these various guidance documents as efforts “to promote
predictability and transparency in white collar enforcement and to clarify the
benefits of a responsible corporate approach to misconduct . . . .”24 In formalizing
the Corporate Enforcement Policy into the Justice Manual, DOJ made clear it
intended to increase transparency with the hope of encouraging compliant behaviors,
in particular voluntary disclosures.25
C. United States Sentencing Guidelines
The factors included in the Corporate Prosecution Principles and reinforced
through additional DOJ guidance are, of course, far from novel. Most notably,
several of the factors are also included in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the
Corporate Prosecution Principles provide factors to be considered, they are
explicitly intended to aide in a process that remains largely art and not science,
noting that prosecutors have “substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how,
and even whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”26
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines go a step further, detailing explicit and
concrete calculations as to Determining the Fine for Organizations. Under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, a series of factors are used to arrive at a Culpability Score,
which then translates to a minimum (as low as 0.05) and maximum (as high as 4.0)
fine multiplier, each of which is multiplied by the base fine (frequently the gain to
the organization from the offense or the loss from the offense caused by the
organization) to create the minimum and maximum of the guideline fine range.27
Factors related to compliant behavior are central to calculation of the
Culpability Score. As a result, a potential guideline fine can decrease by 40–80%
based on cooperation with the government’s investigation, 60–120% based on the
existence of a pre-existing effective compliance program, 100–200% based on a

23

Id. § 9-47.120(3).
John F. Savarese, Ralph M. Levene & David B. Anders, The DOJ’s Updated
Guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (May 14, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019
/05/14/the-dojs-updated-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/ [https://perma.cc/X
SL7-HSEH].
25
Rosenstein, supra note 18 (“[The Corporate Enforcement Policy] will increase the
volume of voluntary disclosures . . . .”).
26
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.200, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-928000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations
[https://perma.cc/EHU9RV2K] (revised July 2020).
27
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.4–2.7 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS76-9GJU].
24
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self-disclosure, or 160–320% in the case of an entity with a pre-existing effective
compliance program and a self-disclosure.28
Notably, the calculations related to compliant behaviors are significantly
greater than adjustments made based on simple acceptance of responsibility. The
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines multiplier reduction for acceptance of responsibility is
only 20–40%—smaller than adjustments based on the size of the organization and
the role within the organization of the responsible individuals.29 Under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, the reduction for a defendant organization’s self-disclosure
is five times the reduction for mere acceptance of responsibility, and the reductions
for cooperation or for having had an effective compliance and ethics program in
place are two times and three times the acceptance of responsibility deduction,
respectively.30
Numerous factors, including considerations mirroring sentencing factors
detailed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3572(a), are then used to determine the amount
of a fine within (or outside of) the applicable guideline range.31 In the context of a
significant corporate resolution, the Culpability Score deductions relating to
compliant behavior can easily make a concrete and visible difference of tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars in a criminal resolution.32
28

Id. Cooperation with the investigation leads to a deduction of 2 points from the
culpability score, having an effective pre-existing compliance program leads to a deduction
of 3 points, and self-disclosure a deduction of 5 points. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1),(g)(1), (g)(2). Based
on the Minimum and Maximum Multipliers listed in U.S.S.G., id. § 8C2.6, a 2-point
deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier by 0.4 and the maximum multiplier by 0.8;
a 3-point deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier by 0.6 and the maximum
multiplier by 1.2; a 5-point deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier by 1.0 and the
maximum multiplier by 2.0; and an 8-point deduction would reduce the minimum multiplier
by 1.6 and the maximum multiplier by 3.2. Id. § 8C2.6.
29
Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3) (subtracting 1 point from the culpability score for acceptance of
responsibility); id. § 8C2.5(b) (adding between 1-5 points based on the size of the
organization and the role within the organization of the responsible individuals).
30
Id.
31
Id. § 8C2.8.
32
See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 8, 13, United States v. Olympus Med. Sys. Corp., No.
2:18-cr-00727-SRC (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018), www.justice.gov/usao-nj/press-release/file/111
8431/download [https://perma.cc/2G44-L7NV]. In December 2018, Olympus Medical
Systems Corporation (“Olympus”) entered into a criminal plea agreement with DOJ,
pursuant to which Olympus agreed to pay a fine of $80 million (plus criminal forfeiture of
$5 million). According to the Plea Agreement, the payment was based on a culpability score
of 7—reflecting a 2-point deduction for cooperation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(2)—
leading to a multiplier range of 1.4 to 2.8 and a Guidelines Fine Range of $46.2 to $92.4
million. If not for the cooperation credit, Olympus’s culpability score would have been 9 and
its multiplier range would have been 1.8 to 3.6, leading to a Guidelines Fine Range of $59.4
to $118.8 million and a fine of $103.4 million if the fine was similarly approximately 87%
of the Maximum. If Olympus had not only cooperated but self-disclosed, its culpability score
would have been 4 and its multiplier range would have been 0.8 to 1.6, leading to a
Guidelines Fine range of $26.4 to $52.8 million and a fine of $45.9 million, if the fine was
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The combined impact of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and DOJ policy is
substantial transparency as to how DOJ calculates criminal fines and how compliant
behaviors impact those calculations. One recent example, typical of the level of
transparency in criminal resolutions, was DOJ’s resolution of criminal FCPA
charges against TechnipFMC plc through a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(DPA).33 In the DPA, DOJ included the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines calculations in
explaining how the fine was calculated, noting the base fine was $141,040,000, and
the Culpability Score was ten, with the calculation laid out in the DPA.
Culpability Score.34 Based upon USSG § 8C2.5, the culpability score is
10, calculated as follows:
(a)

Base Culpability Score

(b)(1)

the organization had 5,000 or more employees
and an individual within high-level personnel
of the organization participated in, condoned,
or was willfully ignorant of the offense

+5

(c)(2)

Prior History less than 5 years

+2

(g)(2)

Cooperation, Acceptance

TOTAL

5

-2
___
10

similarly approximately 87% of the Maximum. Thus, the act of cooperation presumably
saved Olympus approximately $23 million, and Olympus could presumably have saved
$57.5 million had it self-disclosed and cooperated. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5(g)(1)–(2), 8C2.6 (2018).
33
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. TechnipFMC plc, 19-cr-278
(E.D.N.Y 2019) [hereinafter TechnipFMC DPA], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1177316/download [https://perma.cc/WRH3-A9TT]; see also Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Just., TechnipFMC Plc. and U.S.-Based Subsidiary Agree to Pay Over $296
Million in Global Penalties to Resolve Foreign Bribery Case (June 25, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/technipfmc-plc-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree-pay-over296-million-global-penalties-resolve
[https://perma.cc/MPH9-YGWU]
(“‘Today’s
resolution takes aim at the scourge of bribery, but does so in a fair and evenhanded way,’
said Assistant Attorney General [Brian A.] Benczkowski. ‘It is a testament to the strength
and effectiveness of international coordination in the fight against corruption, but also an
acknowledgement that the Department is fully committed to reaching fair and just resolutions
with companies that fully cooperate and remediate.’”).
34
TechnipFMC DPA, supra note 33, at 8.

1182

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, it is explicit that the reduction of two points
consisted of one point based on the company’s acceptance of responsibility and an
additional point based on the company’s cooperation.35
DOJ went on to provide the fine range ($282,080,000–$564,160,000) based on
the Culpability Score and stated in the agreement that, if not for the defendant’s
remedial measures and cooperation, DOJ would have viewed the appropriate fine as
“a point near the midpoint of the applicable [ ] fine range” because the defendant
was a recidivist.36 DOJ provided details regarding the defendant’s remedial
measures and cooperation and made explicit that TechnipFMC “received full
cooperation and remediation credit . . . [a] 25 percent reduction for cooperation and
remediation,” leading to an ultimate fine of $296,184,000.37 The defendant—and
others throughout industry and the defense bar—can see that DOJ reduced the fine
by 25% (more than $98 million) based on TechnipFMC’s cooperation and
remediation.
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. The FCA Is the Government’s Primary Health Care Fraud Enforcement Tool
While for some industries, criminal prosecutions are DOJ’s primary
enforcement mechanism, in the health care industry, that honor has long been held
by civil cases brought under the False Claims Act.38 In Fiscal Year 2019 alone, DOJ
35

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5(g)(2)–(3) (2018).
TechnipFMC DPA, supra note 33, at 5.
37
Id. at 3–5.
38
See, e.g., Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government’s Stick
and Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 327–30 (1999)
(referring to the FCA as “the [g]overnment’s [p]rimary [w]eapon [a]gainst [f]raud” and
pointing to the FCA’s qui tam provision as a primary reason for its growth); Pamela H. Bucy,
Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV.
57, 59–60 (1999) (concluding that the FCA’s qui tam provision, lower mens rea requirement,
and lower burden of proof, combined with the fact that most health care providers have
substantial assets, makes the FCA a “potent and appropriate weapon to use against fraudulent
health care providers”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes
Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV.
239, 247 (1999) (noting DOJ’s increasing reliance on the FCA to prosecute health care
offenses).
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office of Inspector
General (“OIG”) maintains a separate authority to bring civil monetary penalty (“CMP”)
actions based on a wide range of program violations. Civil Monetary Penalties and
Affirmative Exclusions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEATH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
enforcement/cmp/index.asp [https://perma.cc/DA4D-QT39] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020).
However, the size of CMP actions and resulting publicity from those actions has paled in
comparison to FCA recoveries. See Stephen Payne, John Partridge, Jonathan Phillips, Julie
Rapoport Schenker, Claudia Kraft, Maya Nuland, Stevie Pearl, Susanna Schuemann, Margo
36

2020]

HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT

1183

recovered $2.6 billion from settlements and judgments in FCA cases involving the
health care industry, representing the tenth consecutive year that DOJ’s civil health
care fraud settlements and judgments have exceeded $2 billion.39 Between 2010 and
2019, DOJ has recovered $25.3 billion from settlements and judgments in FCA cases
involving the health care industry.40 With eye-catching numbers year after year,
FCA recoveries have been DOJ’s primary method of targeting organizations for
health care enforcement.
DOJ has noted that, particularly in the health care arena, FCA cases are a
primary mechanism not only for punishing misconduct but also for deterring fraud.
In the December 2018 press release announcing the Fiscal Year 2018 recoveries,
DOJ noted, “the Department’s vigorous pursuit of health care fraud prevents billions
[] in losses by deterring those who might otherwise try to cheat the system for their
own gain.”41
B. Background and Structure of the FCA
Congress originally enacted the FCA during the Civil War in response to
concerns regarding fraud against the government by contractors selling “sick mules,
lame horses, sawdust instead of gunpowder, and rotted ships with fresh paint.”42
While the FCA remains an important tool for enforcement in government
contracting, over the last thirty years, it has been primarily used to address health
care fraud. In Fiscal Year 2019, for example, the $2.6 billion recovered by DOJ from
FCA cases involving the health care industry was roughly 87% of the $3 billion
recovered in total by DOJ from FCA cases.43

Uhrman & Madelyn La France, 2018 Year-End FDA and Health Care Compliance and
Enforcement Update – Providers, GIBSON DUNN 9–11 (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.gibson
dunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2018-year-end-fda-health-care-compliance-enforce
ment-update-providers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ9C-JHKU] (showing 135 CMP recoveries
for $71 million in 2018 compared with 813 total civil actions, including FCA suits, for $2.91
billion in fiscal year 2018).
39
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-actcases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/WM26-VCV2].
40
Id. (providing figures for 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS – HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1080696/
download [https://perma.cc/AV58-KP29] (providing figures for 2010–21, 2018).
41
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $2.8 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claimsact-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/B5VP-SKCW].
42
Id. (quoting Assistant Attorney General Jody Hunt).
43
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 2018, supra note 41.
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The FCA imposes penalties on anyone who “knowingly presents . . . a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the Federal Government.44 A violation
of the FCA “includes four elements: falsity, causation, knowledge, and
materiality.”45 In the context of the FCA, to act “knowingly” means that a person
“has actual knowledge[,]” “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information[,]” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information[,]” but does not require proof of intent to defraud.46
The FCA provides that a person who violates the FCA “is liable to the United
States Government for a civil penalty of not less than [$11,665] and not more than
[$23,331] . . . plus three times the amount of damages which the Government
sustains because of the act [of the person violating the FCA].”47 Damages (referred
to as single damages) are generally the amount of money the United States paid as
a result of the false claim.48 Thus, recovering single damages can be seen as making
the Government whole.49
The Supreme Court previously described treble damages (three times the
amount of damages) as “essentially punitive in nature,” but later clarified that “treble
damages have a compensatory side, serving remedial purposes in addition to
punitive objectives.”50 Whether characterized as remedial or punitive, it is clear that
the prospect of having to repay not only the amount wrongfully obtained but instead
three times the amount wrongfully obtained plus penalties used by DOJ in an effort
to deter wrongful conduct in the first place. The only limitation on recoveries in the
FCA statute is the inclusion of a Reduced Damages provision, which is triggered by
self-disclosure and full cooperation before initiation of any government
investigation into the misconduct.51 Where the Reduced Damages criteria are
satisfied, the Government is entitled to recover only double damages.52 The FCA’s
statutory language (“is liable”) renders treble damages and penalties mandatory
unless the Reduced Damages provision applied, and while courts have placed some
44

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
See United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016);
Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc, 659 F.3d 295, 304–05 (3d Cir. 2011)).
46
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)–(B).
47
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2020) (providing updated inflationadjusted figures for penalties after November 2, 2015).
48
See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1943).
49
As discussed below and recently recognized by DOJ, because of lost interest and other
factors, a recovery actually must be beyond single damages to truly make the government
whole.
50
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000);
Cook Cty. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003).
51
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). As detailed below, DOJ’s application of the FCA has
rendered this provision essentially meaningless; however, the existence of the Reduced
Damages provision indicates a clear intent by the statute’s drafters to reward self-disclosures.
52
Id. (“[T]he court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person.”).
45
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constitutional limits on the number of available penalties, there is virtually no check
on the Government’s ability to recover, at least, treble damages.53
DOJ has long trumpeted its ability to obtain treble damages plus penalties. One
2018 DOJ press release announcing an FCA settlement went so far as to note that
treble damages are the “typical[]” liability under the FCA.54 But DOJ is not required
to demand treble damages (or penalties) in resolving an FCA case. While industry
and the defense bar have long believed that DOJ rarely seeks treble damages,
notably, there is no guidance or transparency from DOJ as to what constitutes a
standard settlement or what factors influence what DOJ will demand.55 This is in
stark contrast to the extensive and public disclosures by DOJ on its settlement
policies in criminal cases.
The rise in FCA cases, particularly in the area of health care fraud, can be traced
back to amendments to the FCA in 1986, which provided substantial incentives for
whistleblowers (referred to as “relators”) to file qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the
government alleging false claims.56 Relators can recover between fifteen and thirty
percent of the proceeds of a resolution, depending on whether the government elects
to take the case over from the relator (this is referred to as the government
“intervening”) or if the relator proceeds without government intervention, and also
depending “on the extent to which the person [i.e., the relator] contributed to the
prosecution.”57
In Fiscal Year 2019, relators filed 633 such qui tam suits and $2.1 billion of the
$3 billion recovered in Fiscal Year 2019 was attributable to qui tams.58 The
government paid out $265 million to relators.59 Although only roughly one-quarter
53
See, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and penalties may in some cases
limit the application of treble damages and penalty awards); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.120 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-4-4000-commerciallitigation#4-4.120 [https://perma.cc/393X-BTH8] (“Courts may limit the imposition of
statutory civil penalties as a violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, such as where
the civil penalty violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
54
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company Agrees to Pay $5.25
Million (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edky/pr/medical-equipmentcompany-agrees-pay-525-million-resolve-allegations-fraudulent-claims [https://perma.cc/
UEP7-7EFM].
55
See, e.g., Brian C. Elmer & Alan W.H. Gourley, FCA Settlements: A Practical Guide
for Defense Counsel, CROWELL & MORING LLP, https://www.crowell.com/documents/doc
assocfktype_presentations_440.pdf [https://perma.cc/52E2-F2PG] (last visited Aug. 17,
2020) (“In settling, DOJ does not insist on treble damages, although it will not acknowledge
any specific policy to settle for less than treble damages. It does insist that, at a minimum,
the government must be compensated for its entire loss, and it usually strives for at least
double damages.”).
56
31 U.S.C. § 3730.
57
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
58
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 2018, supra note 41.
59
Id.
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of filed qui tams are successful, they regularly account for a large majority of FCA
actions and recoveries.60
In addition to bringing information to the government’s attention and driving
substantial recoveries, the mechanics of the FCA result in relators and their counsel
effectively determining who within DOJ will work on a particular case. Qui tams
are filed in one of the ninety-four federal districts and served upon both the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in that district and the U.S. Attorney General in Washington,
D.C.61 Health care FCA cases are generally handled either by an individual U.S.
Attorney’s Office working in conjunction with the Commercial Litigation Branch
of DOJ’s Civil Division or by an individual U.S. Attorney’s Office without the
involvement of DOJ’s Civil Division. By controlling the decision of where to file an
FCA suit, relators’ counsel thus controls which U.S. Attorney’s Office will be
assigned to work on the case.
Although data is sparse and precise numbers are unknown, there is agreement
that while hundreds of FCA cases are resolved each year, remarkably, few do so via
trial.62
U.S. Attorney’s Offices have the authority to settle claims where the gross
amount of the original claim does not exceed $10 million.63 DOJ’s Civil Division—
the Commercial Litigation Branch in the case of health care FCA cases—must
approve settlements above those amounts unless DOJ’s Civil Division delegates
responsibility for the case to the individual U.S. Attorney’s Office.64
C. Civil Resolution Guidance
As detailed above, there is a long and detailed history documenting DOJ’s
commitment to rewarding compliant corporate behavior in criminal resolutions.
Until recently, however, there was virtually no formal guidance regarding how DOJ
60

BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST, ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, BRIETTA R. CLARK, ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, ROBERT
GATTER, JAIME S. KING & ELIZABETH PENDO, HEALTH L AW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 994 (8th ed. 2018).
61
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.110 (2019), https://www.justice.gov
/jm/jm-4-4000-commercial-litigation [https://perma.cc/3BD8-7QJ6].
62
There is no available data tracking the number or percentage of FCA cases which end
in trials, but there is widespread agreement that the number and percentage are low. See Joan
H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1413 (2002) (citing Leon Aussprung, Fraud and Abuse: Federal
Civil Health Care Litigation and Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 3 (1998) (describing the
FCA cases which go to trial as a “small minority”)); Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 264
n.142 (noting lack of data and providing anecdotal evidence that few FCA cases are tried).
63
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL, CH. 46,
REDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO COMPROMISE CIVIL CLAIMS (2016) [hereinafter DOJ
CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-46redelegation-authority-compromise-civil-claims [https://perma.cc/PVD5-FKGJ].
64
See id.
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would consider and reward compliant behaviors in resolving civil cases.65 The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines are, of course, inapplicable to civil cases, leaving DOJ
unconstrained in electing what policy to apply and how to calculate appropriate
resolutions, beyond the Reduced Damages provision of the False Claims Act.66
Before the issuance of the Yates Memo, there was substantial skepticism within
the industry and the defense bar as to whether DOJ had a policy of rewarding
compliant behaviors in civil cases at all. It was thus notable that the Yates Memo,
which focused heavily on the link between criminal and civil investigations,
explicitly instructed civil prosecutors to take corporate cooperation into account.67
None of the pre-Yates Memo iterations or discussions of the Corporate Prosecution
Principles mentioned the impact of the Corporate Prosecution Principles on civil
cases handled by DOJ or required DOJ’s civil prosecutors to take the factors into
account.68
Still, while the Yates Memo made clear that civil prosecutors were required to
reward cooperation, the memo and its aftermath offered virtually no guidance as to
how cooperation was to be taken into account—a reality certainly noticed by

65

Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 4, §§ 9-28.700–9-28.1000 (establishing
compliant behavior factors starting in 2015). Within DOJ, the Civil Division and Criminal
Division have separate leadership and reporting structures, with oversight for both Civil and
Criminal non-existent until the level of Deputy Attorney General—just one level below the
Attorney General. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ORGANIZATION CHART (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart [https://perma.cc/6W85-RYY6].
In most U.S. Attorney’s Offices, oversight for both Civil and Criminal generally does
not occur until the level of the U.S. Attorney or the U.S. Attorney’s Executive Office. At
least one U.S. Attorney’s Office, the District of New Jersey, has combined oversight for both
Civil and Criminal Health Care matters under the leadership of one Unit Chief, but that
structure is the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Medical Device Company Will Pay $646 Million for Making Illegal Payments to Doctors
and Hospitals in United States and Latin America (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/medical-equipment-company-will-pay-646-million-making-illegal-payments-doct
ors-and-hospitals [https://perma.cc/HUQ5-86N3].
DOJ encourages parallel proceedings, and the Yates Memo specifically encourages
criminal and civil prosecutors to be in regular communication. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE
MANUAL, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL, CH. 27, COORDINATION OF PARALLEL
CRIMINAL, CIVIL, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/organization-and-functions-manual-27-parallel-proceedings
[https://perma.cc/3HX6-26D5]; Yates Memo, supra note 10. Consistent with the Corporate
Prosecution Principles, there is no clear guidance as to when a case should be treated as a
civil case, a criminal case, or both. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL §9-28.000 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizat
ions [https://perma.cc/6RVG-EMED].
66
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
67
Yates Memo, supra note 10.
68
See Filip Memo, supra note 5; Holder Memo, supra note 9; Thompson Memo, supra
note 10; McNulty Memo, supra note 10; Yates Memo, supra note 10.
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industry and the defense bar.69 Both in relation to the Yates Memo and since, DOJ
made statements in support of a compliant behavior discount in FCA cases, at least
as it pertains to cooperation. In particular, following the publication of the Yates
Memo in 2015, the Justice Manual chapter on civil cases was updated to include a
reference to the requirements for business organization cooperation to earn credit in
civil cases.70 The reference, however, provided only one example—that “the
Department’s position on ‘full cooperation’ under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(2), is that, at minimum, all relevant facts about responsible individuals
must be voluntarily provided. . .” referring to an entity’s ability to take advantage of
the statutory provision limiting FCA damages to double actual damages in the
context of a voluntary self-disclosure.71
In a series of public statements in 2018 and early 2019, DOJ affirmed that the
corporate benefits in FCA cases for engaging in compliant behaviors go beyond the
self-disclosure provision of the FCA. In June 2018, Acting Associate Attorney
General Jesse Panuccio delivered a speech affirming DOJ’s commitment to reward
corporate defendants for “invest[ing] in strong compliance measures” and for
“genuine cooperation,” noting that “the extent of the discount will depend on the
nature of the cooperation and how helpful it is to the Department’s investigation,
including our pursuit of individual wrongdoers.”72 Then in January 2019, Deputy
Associate Attorney General Stephen Cox delivered a speech at an FCA conference
in which he assured the audience that “the Department is committed to rewarding
companies that invest in strong compliance programs and who cooperate with our
investigations into wrongdoing.”73
69
Gejaa Gobena, Mitch Lazris, Peter S. Spivack & Karla Aghedo, DOJ Embraces a
More Realistic Position on Corporate Cooperation, 33 No. 05 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 3, WL 124214 (2019) (noting that “the impact of cooperation on the calculation of
civil FCA settlement amounts remains a mystery” in an article by Hogan Lovells US LLP
attorneys, three of whom previously worked for DOJ); Laura McLane & Rebecca C. Martin,
Cooperation in the Eye of the Beholder: DOJ Official Bill Baer Elaborates on Cooperation
in False Claims Act and Other Civil Enforcement Matters, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY
(Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.mwe.com/insights/doj-elaborates-on-cooperation-in-fca/
[https://perma.cc/69DH-9NX8]. This article by McDermott, Will & Emery attorneys, one of
whom previously worked for DOJ, notes that “critically, defendants continue to be in the
dark about what benefits cooperation genuinely confers” when faced with prosecution. Id.
70
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-3.100(3) (2018), https://www.justice.gov
/jm/jm-4-3000-compromising-and-closing#4-3.100 [https://perma.cc/NQ5Q-E5ZN].
71
Id.
72
Jesse Panuccio, Acting Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the
American Bar Association’s 12th National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui
Tam Enforcement (June 14, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/speech/acting-associate-attorney-general-jesse-panuccio-delivers-remarks-americanbar [https://perma.cc/G4L5-J8L9].
73
Stephen Cox, Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the 2019
Advanced Forum on False Claims and Qui Tam Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2019), in JUST. NEWS,
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-associate-attorney-general-
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Finally, in May 2019, through a statement from Assistant Attorney General
Jody Hunt and accompanying changes to the Justice Manual, DOJ issued for the first
time, formal guidance regarding rewards for compliant behavior in FCA cases.74, 75
While DOJ has not said so explicitly, indications are that the “Guidelines for
Taking Disclosure, Cooperation, and Remediation into Account in False Claims Act
Matters” are intended to represent transparency regarding already existing policy
rather than a change in policy, and commentators have described it as simply
“providing more insight into the Justice Department’s process.”76 The
announcement accompanying the FCA Guidance referred to the FCA Guidance as
“formal guidance,” stating that the FCA Guidance “explain[s] the manner in which
the Department of Justice awards credit to defendants who cooperate with the
Department during a False Claims Act investigation,” and noting that “[t]he formal
policy . . . identifies the type of cooperation eligible for credit”—language consistent
with clarification and transparency regarding an already existing policy.77 And while
Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Claire McCusker Murray gave a
speech two weeks after the release of the FCA Guidance in which she twice referred
to the FCA Guidance as a “new policy” and also referred to the FCA Guidance as a
“False Claims Act reform,” in the same speech she provided two examples of the
policy in action—resolutions announced six months and two months, respectively,
prior to the issuance of the FCA Guidance.78
The FCA Guidance “identif[ies] factors that will be considered and credit that
will be provided” based on compliant behaviors.79 For self-disclosure, cooperation,
and remediation, the FCA Guidance provides examples of conduct that would
constitute voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.80
The substance of the FCA Guidance with regard to compliant behaviors largely
mirrors the Corporate Prosecution Guidelines. Two exceptions, however, are worth
noting. First, the FCA Guidance includes “[a]dmitting liability or accepting
stephen-cox-delivers-remarks-2019-advanced-forum-false [https://perma.cc/4H6J-SAKY].
74
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Issues Guidance on False Claims Act Matters and
Updates, Justice Manual (May 7, 2019) [hereinafter FCA Guidance], https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-act-matters-and-updates-just
ice-manual. [https://perma.cc/QGR2-7F9V].
75
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.112 (2019) https://www.justice.gov/jm/
jm-4-4000-commercial-litigation#4-4.112. [https://perma.cc/59SR-YUGY].
76
Jacob Rund, Justice’s False Claims Guide Meant to Spur Cooperation, BL (May 9,
2019, 4:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-governance/justices-falseclaims-guide-meant-to-spur-cooperation?context=search&index=0 [https://perma.cc/F2KU
-PBEF].
77
FCA Guidance, supra note 74.
78
Claire McCusker Murray, Principal Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Remarks at the Compliance Week Annual Conference (May 20, 2019), in JUST. NEWS at 3–
6 (May 20, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-associateattorney-general-claire-mccusker-murray-compliance [https://perma.cc/PW5B-EC7L].
79
FCA Guidance, supra note 74.
80
Id.
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responsibility for the wrongdoing or relevant conduct,” among the “Forms of
Cooperation.”81 This is unlike in the criminal context, where acceptance of
responsibility is a prerequisite for cooperation credit rather than an example of
cooperation, both under DOJ criminal policy and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
(where acceptance of responsibility without cooperation is separately rewarded).82
In addition, as detailed in Sections III.C. and F., below, it appears that DOJ has been
rewarding defendants for their willingness to settle FCA cases, regardless of whether
they are accepting responsibility by making admissions or otherwise acknowledging
wrongdoing.
Second, for the existence of a pre-existing compliance program, the FCA
Guidance does not state that it will lead to a reduction in the multiplier and instead
notes “the Department may take into account the prior existence of a compliance
program in evaluating a defendant’s liability under the False Claims Act. For
example, the Department may consider the nature and effectiveness of such a
compliance program in evaluating whether any violation of law was committed
knowingly.”83 It is unclear whether this statement is simply DOJ noting the
relevance of a pre-existing compliance program for a legal determination of whether
the conduct was committed “knowingly”—an element under the FCA—or is meant
to imply a benefit is available to defendants whose conduct is deemed to meet the
elements of the FCA despite having a meaningful pre-existing compliance
program.84 If solely the former, this would seemingly represent an unintentional
departure from long-standing DOJ policy (also found in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines) rewarding pre-existing compliance programs—policy which DOJ has
reiterated in strong terms as recently as November 2019: “The corporate compliance
function is in some ways more important than the prosecution function. It can
actually prevent misconduct in the first place through robust systems of controls,
and by fostering a culture where compliance is valued and rewarded.”85
81

Id.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5(g)(2)–(3) (2018).
83
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4-4.112.
84
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
85
Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the 20th
Annual Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Compliance Congress (Nov. 6, 2019), in JUST.
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-brianbenczkowski-delivers-remarks-20th-annual-pharmaceutical
[https://perma.cc/R9RYBQHP].
It would not, however, be the first time in recent memory DOJ has seemed to stray from
emphasizing the importance of pre-existing compliance programs. See Andrew Spalding,
Restoring Pre-Existing Compliance Through the FCPA Pilot Program, 48 U. TOL. L. REV.
519, 520–21 (2017) (lamenting DOJ’s neglecting to incentivize investments in pre-existing
compliance under the FCPA Pilot Program). The lack of attention to pre-existing compliance
noted by Spalding with regard to the FCPA Pilot Program was not addressed when the Pilot
Program was formalized into the Corporate Enforcement Policy in November 2017. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 20, § 9-47.120.
82
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The FCA Guidance states that credit for compliant behaviors will “[m]ost often
. . . be exercised by reducing the penalties or damages multiple sought by the
Department.”86 A clear parallel exists between a reduction of the FCA multiplier and
a reduction of the criminal fine multiplier. In certain respects, the FCA Guidance is
thus in line with the criminal-side trend towards increased transparency in rewarding
compliant behaviors. The Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General
acknowledged as much in her May 2019 speech when she referred to the FCA
Guidance as “tak[ing] a page from the Corporate Enforcement Policy.”87 That is true
in so far as the FCA Guidance offers clarity as to how compliant behavior will be
judged and as to what compliant behavior will be rewarded. But the Corporate
Enforcement Policy in the criminal context applies benefits for engaging in
compliant behaviors, which are specifically articulated ahead of time and explicitly
identified at the time of resolution, while the FCA Guidance applicable in the civil
context neither provides the former nor promises the latter.
Even with the FCA Guidance, and unlike the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and
the Corporate Enforcement Policy, no DOJ guidance provides information as to how
multipliers are calculated in the absence of compliant behaviors, nor offers any
specifics as to what amount or percentage a resolution will be reduced based on
compliant behaviors. Without specific information, industry and the defense bar
have thus still been left with attempting to use individual resolutions to glean what
form compliant behavior “credit” would take, an impossible task given that
individual cases are, by their nature, highly fact-specific.
III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. The Multiplier & the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act
Though substantial attention has been paid to FCA cases, lack of DOJ
transparency has resulted in a complete absence of empirical analysis regarding how
DOJ wields the tremendous power provided to it under the FCA. Until 2018, it was
virtually impossible to analyze FCA settlements and come away with any
understanding of what impact the government’s view of the defendant’s compliance
program or level of cooperation (or anything else) had on the government’s
calculations. In reaching and announcing FCA settlements, DOJ historically did not
disclose the amount of “single damages” or the multiplier used to arrive at the
ultimate resolution. Even the defendant could be left in the dark, as FCA settlements
did not necessarily involve a meeting of the minds between the government and the
defendant as to the method of calculation.
For example, when the Department of Justice reached the largest health care
fraud settlement in U.S. history—a parallel criminal-civil resolution with
GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) in 2012 requiring GSK to pay $3 billion, the criminal
plea agreement included detailed calculations showing how DOJ arrived at the $1
86
87

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.120, supra note 53.
McCusker Murray, supra note 78.
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billion figure GSK paid as fine and forfeiture pursuant to the criminal plea, while
the three separate Civil Settlement Agreements (CSAs) totaling $2 billion in
payments under the FCA provided no information about whether that figure
represented single damages, treble damages plus penalties, or somewhere in
between.88 As significantly, like the TechnipFMC DPA described above,89 the GSK
criminal plea agreement identified the specific deduction made based on GSK’s
cooperation in the government’s investigation and acceptance of responsibility, and
the criminal plea agreement was clear that GSK did not receive a deduction for selfdisclosure or for having an effective pre-existing compliance program.90 None of the
three GSK CSAs provided any information about what role GSK’s compliant
behaviors, or lack of compliant behaviors, played in DOJ’s arrival at the $2 billion
civil figure.91 Just as the GSK criminal plea agreement’s transparency was typical of
criminal DOJ resolutions, the complete lack of transparency in the GSK CSAs was
typical of civil DOJ resolutions.92
That changed, however, with the 2017 passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.93
Section 13306 of the Act made clear that business organizations can deduct only
88
Compare Plea Agreement at 3–6, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 1:12cr-10206 (D. Mass. July 02, 2012) [hereinafter Plea Agreement, GlaxoSmithKline],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/plea-agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PH5H-RYYC], with Avandia Civil Settlement Agreement at 6–7, United
States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. 2012), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/avandia-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5
A5-K5ZQ], Nominals Civil Settlement Agreement at 8–9, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline
LLC, No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. June 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/nominals-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH5H-RYYC], and
Off Label Civil Settlement Agreement at 6–8, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No.
1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012
/07/02/off-label-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2C2-6BNB].
89
See supra Section I.C.
90
See Plea Agreement, GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 88, at 3–4.
91
See Avandia Civil Settlement Agreement, supra note 88, at 6; Civil Settlement
Nominals Agreement at 8–9, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D.
Mass. July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/nom
inals-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W6L-MNLN]; Off Label Civil Settlement
Agreement at 6, United States v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC No. 1:12-cr-10206 (D. Mass. July
2,
2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/07/02/off-labelagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2C2-6BNB].
92
I have not found any CSAs prior to early 2018 which included any information about
how DOJ calculated the settlement figure.
93
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). The Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act was the most sweeping reform of the Tax Code since the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. William G. Gale, Hilary Gelfond, Aaron Krupkin, Mark J. Mazur, & Eric Toder,
Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, TAX POLICY CTR. 1 (June 13,
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summ
ary_paper_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XC9-HS88]. While much attention has been paid to
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s impact on individual and corporate tax liability, and its setting
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those portions of settlements paid to the government that they can establish were
paid as restitution or expended to come into compliance with the law.94 (A defendant
settling for single damages can thus deduct the entire cost of the settlement, while a
defendant settling for treble damages can only deduct one-third.) Significantly, the
statute requires that the money must be specifically identified as such in a court order
or settlement agreement and imposes on the government an obligation to provide
notice to the Internal Revenue Service and the settling party of the restitution amount
contained within civil settlements.95 In response, DOJ has regularly been including
the “restitution” figure in FCA CSAs since early 2018, from which the multiplier
used in each particular case can be calculated.96 With that, for the first time,
systematic analysis of DOJ resolutions is possible.
The analysis which follows attempts to fill in this gap by examining resolutions
along with multiple different factors.
B. Methodology
I have attempted to review the CSAs from all civil-only FCA settlements
entered into between health care business organizations and DOJ between early
2018 and May 31, 2019, as well as the accompanying DOJ press releases and other
public statements made by DOJ or the settling defendants.97 Where possible, I have
tracked: the dollar amount of the resolution; the amount of the resolution which
constituted restitution under the CSA; whether the case stemmed from the filing of
a qui tam; the U.S. Attorney’s Office involved in the case; whether DOJ’s
Commercial Litigation Branch was involved in the case; whether there were indicia
of acceptance of responsibility; and whether there were indicia of compliant
behaviors. Some CSAs were not available. Several available CSAs did not reference
a restitution figure or contained arrangements which made determination of the
intended multiplier impossible, and, unfortunately, there is no mechanism to
determine whether there have been any CSAs that my analysis did not identify. My
at zero dollars, the amount of the shared responsibility payment imposed as a penalty on
those who failed to ensure that they had minimum essential coverage to satisfy the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, there has been little focus on the
Section most relevant to this Article.
94
§ 13306, 131 Stat. at 2126–28.
95
Id. at 2127.
96
See, e.g., Civil Settlement Agreement at 4, United States v. Dermatology Assocs. of
Cent. N.Y., No. 5:15-cv-00315-TJM-ATB (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.
gov/usao-ndny/press-release/file/1117066/download [https://perma.cc/ZZY5-XZT3].
97
The four identified FCA resolutions with criminal components were excluded from
the analysis, as it would be impossible with current information to account for the impact of
the monetary components of the criminal resolution (fine and forfeiture) on the civil
resolution. For example, it is impossible to know whether an FCA amount was reduced
because of the monetary components of the criminal resolution. Regardless, given the small
number, including those resolutions would not have had a notable impact on the analysis.
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analysis includes 118 CSAs, including 89 CSAs for which the restitution and thus
the multiplier could be determined.98
C. Average Multiplier
Despite DOJ’s statements regarding the potential for treble damages plus
penalties under the False Claims Act, for the 89 CSAs for which the multiplier could
be determined, the mean multiplier was 1.78, and the median multiplier was 2.0. Of
those eighty-nine CSAs, seventy-eight (88%) were at or below double damages—
forty-four were at double damages, and thirty-four were between 1.0-1.9, seemingly
confirming widespread sentiment amongst industry and the defense bar that
settlement multipliers are rarely above double damages.99
Table 1: Multipliers
Multiplier
# of CSAs
> 2.0
11
2.0
44
< 2.0
34
There were only eleven CSAs above 2.0, and neither the CSAs nor the DOJ
press releases explained why they had a higher than default multiplier. If those
eleven organizations engaged in conduct DOJ wishes to disincentivize, the lack of
transparency prevents any such general deterrence from taking place.
Notably, this distribution renders the FCA’s Reduced Damages provision, 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2), largely meaningless, and it is not surprising that none of the
CSAs referenced the provision.100 With settlement details now public, business
organizations know that they do not generally need to self-report, or even cooperate
98

A table summarizing the data is included at Appendix 1.
Multipliers were rounded to the nearest tenth for purposes of categorization. Thus,
any multiplier below 2.05 but greater than or equal to 1.95 was considered 2.0 for purposes
of categorization.
Some may question whether DOJ is accurately reporting restitution figures, or whether
DOJ and defendants may in some cases be agreeing on a resolution figure and then engaging
in additional negotiation regarding the percentage attributable to restitution. By its definition,
“restitution” should not be impacted by litigation risk, compliant behaviors, or other factors.
Even if one questions the integrity of the restitution figures, however, given that the signaling
impact of FCA multipliers are geared towards general deterrence rather than specific
deterrence, and because there is no reason to suspect such negotiations would be more
prevalent in certain categories of cases than in others, any such horse trading would not
impact the analysis or its conclusions.
100
As explained in section II.B., supra, the FCA’s Reduced Damages provision
eliminates penalties, and caps the Government’s recovery at double-damages, in the case of
self-disclosure and full cooperation. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). There is little benefit to a
statutory entitlement to a double-damages settlement in exchange for self-disclosure when
virtually all cases are settled at or below double-damages.
99

2020]

HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT

1195

or accept responsibility, to obtain a settlement at or below double-damages. This
necessarily eliminates the provision’s intended incentive.
Given that the FCA Guidance was released during the time period of my
analyses and followed after months of DOJ discussion regarding the guidance
announcement, I also examined whether there was a change in the multipliers over
time. As can be seen visually in Chart 1, there are no indicia that multipliers changed
during this time.
Chart 1: Multipliers over Time

Multipliers Over Time
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Because the execution and announcement of CSAs generally occur months
after an agreement in principle to the key terms, including the dollar amount and the
restitution amount, and CSAs did not consistently identify when such agreements in
principle were reached, it is impossible to separate pre-FCA Guidance CSAs from
post-FCA Guidance CSAs in a way that assures accuracy. It will be useful to repeat
this analysis in the future.
Also notable amongst the data is the fact that sixteen defendant entities (18%)
received multipliers of 1.0. DOJ acknowledged in the FCA Guidance that a
resolution with a multiplier of 1.0 does not even make DOJ whole or leave the
defendant without the benefit of the wrongdoing.101 The FCA Guidance notes that
even where defendants are receiving benefits for compliant behaviors, the benefits
101

See FCA Guidance, supra note 74.
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cannot be so much as to prevent the government from recovering a multiplier
sufficiently above 1.0 to cover the lost interest, cost of investigation, and relator’s
share (in the case of a qui tam).
Several of the DOJ press releases accompanying those sixteen 1.0 multiplier
resolutions included government statements about defendants engaged in
wrongdoing being “held accountable,”102 that the resolution sent a “message [that]
. . . [f]raudulently billing for services is bad business,”103 or other, similar language.
Virtually all involved conduct from several years prior, and therefore a multiplier
substantially above 1.0 would have been required simply to cover interest. These
defendants’ resolutions effectively require them to repay what amounts to a nointerest loan to the government, in at least one case, having kept some or all of the
ill-gotten gains for more than a decade.104 And in terms of the government receiving
“full compensation” as called for under the FCA Guidance,105 in addition to failing
to recover lost interest or costs of investigation, nine of the sixteen were the result
of qui tams, meaning the government paid at least 15% of those recoveries to a
relator.106

102

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Pentec Health, Inc. to Pay $17 Million to Settle
False Claims Act Allegations (Feb. 4, 2019), in JUST. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/pentec-health-inc-pay-17-million-settle-false-claimsact-allegations [https://perma.cc/N5A5-5XEA]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Signature HealthCARE to Pay More than $30 Million to Resolve False Claims Act
Allegations Related to Rehabilitation Therapy (June 8, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (June 8, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/signature-healthcare-pay-more-30-million-resolve-falseclaims-act-allegations-related [https://perma.cc/83RT-VVH4] (“When we determine that
companies are cheating the taxpayers, we will hold them accountable as we have in this
case.”).
103
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Ambulance Company to Pay $9 Million to Settle
False Claims Act Allegations (Mar. 28, 2018), in JUST. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ambulance-company-pay-9-million-settle-false-claims-actallegations [https://perma.cc/AV5G-84QL].
104
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Pentec Health, Inc. to Pay $17 Million, supra note 102
(describing the time period of the misconduct as “2007 to 2018”).
105
See FCA Guidance, supra note 74.
106
While some of these 16 cases may have had limited recoveries due to defendants’
ability to pay, DOJ declined in these cases to require judgments and contingency payments
over time to raise the multiplier in order to achieve even the possibility of the government
being made whole and the defendants fully disgorging their benefits from the misconduct.
See FCA Guidance, supra note 74.
CSAs contain identifying language when a defendants’ lack of financial resources have
impacted the resolution. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 2488
(2020), However, such language does not identify whether the impact took the form of a
reduced multiplier, or instead took other forms, including allowing payments over time.
Given DOJ’s ability to use additional tools—payments over time, judgments, contingency
payments—to achieve whatever multiplier is deemed appropriate, ability to pay cannot be a
plausible or satisfying explanation for the low multipliers found in numerous CSAs.
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D. Significant Impact Based on Involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch
I also examined the government entity handling the resolution. Of the civil-only
resolutions I identified, seventy-four (63%) were handled by individual U.S.
Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch in
Washington. In comparison, forty-four (37%) involved the Commercial Litigation
Branch in addition to a U.S. Attorney’s Office. I then ran a two-sample t-test to
analyze the difference in means for the fifty-three (60%) resolutions handled by
individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Commercial
Litigation Branch for which I could identify the multiplier and the thirty-six (40%)
resolutions which involved the Commercial Litigation Branch in addition to a U.S.
Attorney’s Office for which I could identify the multiplier.
The mean multiplier for cases without the involvement of the Commercial
Litigation Branch (M = 1.86, SD = 0.429) was significantly higher (at 5% level) than
the mean multiplier for cases with the involvement of the Commercial Litigation
Branch (M = 1.66, SD = 0.458), t(87) = 2.107, p = 0.037.107
In considering possible explanations for this significant difference in means, I
examined whether the size of the resolutions might explain it. As noted above, DOJ’s
Civil Division must approve all large settlements unless the case is delegated to an
individual U.S. Attorney’s Office to handle.108 As a result, the mean resolution for
cases without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch was
$7,404,954, while the mean resolution for cases involving the Commercial
Litigation Branch in addition to a U.S. Attorney’s Office was $34,857,974. Given
this, I calculated the correlation between the multiplier and the amount of the
restitution and found the correlation coefficient to be 0.0347—a very weak uphill
(positive) linear relationship. The difference in resolution size thus does not explain
the difference in means.

107
108

See infra Appendix 2.
See DOJ CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 63.
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Chart 2: Restitution Dollar Amount and Multiplier
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Of the eleven CSAs above 2.0, referenced in Section III.B., above, the
Commercial Litigation Branch participated in only one of them—the rest were
handled by individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the participation of the
Commercial Litigation Branch. Interestingly, five of the eleven were from one U.S.
Attorney’s Office (which also had three CSAs at 2.0 and one CSA below 2.0 when
resolving cases without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, and
one CSA at 2.0 resolved with the involvement of the Commercial Litigation
Branch). Given the small sample size relating to each U.S. Attorney’s Office and the
lack of case-specific information, it is fair to ask but impossible to conclude
definitively that there is a lack of consistency among individual U.S. Attorney’s
Offices in determining FCA multipliers. Without greater transparency, however,
such outliers will inevitably lead to speculation that certain prosecuting offices are
requiring higher multipliers than others.
There is reason, both in terms of structure and of incentives, to be concerned
that different U.S. Attorney’s Offices may have different views as to how resolutions
should be calculated. Structurally, there is simply no DOJ guidance—neither public
nor internal—to guide U.S. Attorney’s Offices in calculating FCA multipliers. DOJ
officials have made statements trumpeting the potential exposure for defendants
under the statute. Still, they have provided no guidance to the field as to how they
should determine numbers below the maximum.
This is particularly important because the 118 cases involved forty-six different
U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and twenty-four different U.S. Attorney’s Offices resolved
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fifty-three cases without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch. And
while inconsistency is of concern even were it limited to smaller resolutions, it is
notable that many of the U.S. Attorney’s Office-only resolutions were larger than
might be expected given the delegation rules.109 The mean U.S. Attorney’s Officeonly resolution was $7.4 million, and there were seven U.S. Attorney’s Office-only
resolutions above $10 million.
Various potential explanations exist for this aspect of the data analysis. One
possibility, explained and examined in further detail in Section III.E., below, is that
U.S. Attorney’s Offices might be treating defendants more harshly because of a
desire to improve their standing with the qui tam bar as they compete with other U.S.
Attorney’s Offices for future cases. (Such efforts would not necessarily be limited
to the handling of qui tam cases.110) The difference might also be explained by the
fact that the Commercial Litigation Branch simply has a different view than some
U.S. Attorney’s Offices as to the appropriate method of multiplier calculation, or by
the fact that the Commercial Litigation Branch handles many more cases, leading
U.S. Attorney’s Offices to lack context and potentially view the conduct of their
defendants more harshly.111 As available data continues to grow, further analysis
may provide answers to these questions.
E. Questionable Impact Based on Existence of Qui Tams—Data Bears Watching
The structure of the qui tam system incentivizes individual U.S. Attorney’s
Offices to compete for the attention of relators’ counsel, who are frequently repeat
players, largely control the distribution of cases among U.S. Attorney’s Offices by
deciding where to file their cases, and file their cases where the resolution is likely
to be highest (as relators’ share is a percentage of the government’s recovery). 112 As
109

Id.
Members of the qui tam bar likely do not look only to resolutions stemming from qui
tams when evaluating which U.S. Attorney’s Offices generate the largest settlements. Cases
generated from qui tams may take on increased significance, however, because of statements
made by the involved qui tam attorneys about whether the government maximized the
potential recovery. A substantial number of qui tam attorneys are members of Taxpayers
Against Fraud Education Fund, and participate in a listserv where they share information
regarding, among other things, their experiences with individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices.
Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund Membership, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC.
FUND, https:///member.taf.org/become-a-member [https://perma.cc/2SA3-K24S] (last
visited Aug. 19, 2020).
111
See Adi Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1205 (2017)
(analyzing judicial decision making as to sentencing and arguing that judges sentence given
offenses “more harshly when their caseloads contain relatively milder offenses and more
leniently when their caseloads contain more serious crimes.”).
112
See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1249 (2012) (analyzing qui tam filings
and noting superior litigation outcomes in the large number of qui tams filed by repeat
players); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
110
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a result, there is reason to be concerned that the qui tam system is impacting the
behavior of U.S. Attorney’s Offices in resolving FCA matters. The system may
create pressure for individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices to be tougher on defendants
to impress potential relators’ counsel. Individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices may be
susceptible to pressure from relators’ counsel in individual cases to use a higher
multiplier (whether by taking a higher position as to the baseline multiplier or by
providing less of a compliant behavior benefit).
I examined cases originating from a qui tam and those cases which did not
involve a qui tam. There were seventy-seven (65%) cases involving a qui tam and
forty-one (35%) cases without a qui tam.113 I ran a two-sample t-test to analyze the
difference in means for the fifty-five (62%) of resolutions involving a qui tam for
which I could identify the multiplier and the thirty-four (38%) of resolutions not
involving a qui tam for which I could identify the multiplier.
The mean multiplier for cases involving qui tams (M = 1.82, SD = 0.453) was
higher, but not significantly so, than the mean multiplier for cases which did not
involve qui tams (M = 1.72, SD = 0.442), t(87) = 1.066, p = 0.291.
The incentives referenced above do not apply to the Commercial Litigation
Branch, as the Commercial Litigation Branch does not have to be concerned about
the distribution of cases among U.S. Attorney’s Offices. All cases are filed with the
U.S. Attorney General, and the Commercial Litigation Branch can always elect to
participate in a filed case. As such, I also separately ran a two-sample t-test to
analyze the difference in means for the thirty-one (58%) cases involving a qui tam
and twenty-two (42%) cases without a qui tam among the cases handled by
individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the involvement of the Commercial
Litigation Branch, and for the twenty-four (67%) cases involving a qui tam and
twelve (33%) cases without a qui tam among the cases handled with the involvement
of the Commercial Litigation Branch.
Among the cases handled with the involvement of the Commercial Litigation
Branch, there was virtually no difference in multipliers (1.66 vs. 1.68) between the
qui tam and non-qui tam groups. Among the cases led by individual U.S. Attorney’s
Offices without the involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, however,
there was a greater difference in multipliers (1.95 vs. 1.74) between the qui tam and
non-qui tam groups. With the small sample size, the difference was statistically
significant at 10% level but not at 5% level.
Among cases handled by individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices without the
involvement of the Commercial Litigation Branch, the mean multiplier for cases
involving qui tams (M = 1.95, SD = 0.394) was higher (significantly so at 10% level)
than the mean multiplier for cases which did not involve qui tams (M = 1.74, SD =
0.453), t(51) = 1.831, p = 0.069.114
113
Qui tams account for roughly two-thirds of resolutions, despite DOJ’s increased use
of and investment in data analytics and other sources of case generation. Qui tams accounted
for more than two-thirds of money ($2.1 billion out of $3 billion) recovered by DOJ through
FCA cases in Fiscal Year 2019. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers 2019,
supra note 39.
114
A table summarizing this data is included at Appendix 3.
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This data is suggestive, but it is debatable whether the qui tam system is
impacting the behavior of individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices in resolving FCA
matters, and this bears watching as new data becomes available and the sample size
grows.
F. Can We Infer How DOJ Actually Treats Compliant Behaviors and Acceptance
of Responsibility?
While I attempted to track references in DOJ’s and defendants’ public
comments to compliant behaviors and acceptance of responsibility, the resolutions
were insufficiently transparent as to these factors for statistical analysis to be
appropriate. Unlike in criminal cases, where plea agreements contain the
calculations under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which make clear whether there
was self-disclosure, cooperation, a sufficient pre-existing compliance program, and
acceptance of responsibility, no such calculations are contained within CSAs. As
such, my tracking of references to compliant behaviors and acceptance of
responsibility are useful solely for purposes of anecdotal analysis.
This anecdotal analysis does have significant limitations due to the lack of DOJ
transparency. It is not possible to know whether unknown factors explain some or
all of what appear based on known factors to be unjustified results.115 And where the
anecdotal evidence comes in the form of public statements from settling defendants
touting their compliant behavior rather than from DOJ, it is not possible to know
whether DOJ disagreed with their claims.116 Even with those limitations noted, the
anecdotal evidence suggests, at best, inconsistent application of benefits for
compliant behaviors.
There were some examples of defendants engaging in compliant behaviors and
receiving below mean multiplier resolutions. Two defendants received multipliers
of 1.0, and two other defendants received multipliers of 1.5 as part of resolutions
where DOJ noted in press releases that the defendants had self-disclosed the
misconduct or engaged in other compliant behaviors.117
115
This, of course, is the reason why DOJ’s criminal resolutions have included detailed
calculations, as described supra Section I.C. With such calculations visible, defendants—
and the public—can see the impact of standard factors and are left with a narrower range
within which unenumerated factors may have played a role.
116
While statistical analysis would likely address on a global level any gaming of the
percentage of total settlements allocated to actual damages in order to maximize a
defendant’s tax deduction, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-18.300, it is
possible such behavior could limit the descriptive value of an individual resolution. Gaming
is unlikely to explain the anecdotes described below, however, as it would presumably result
in lowering the multiplier for defendants who have cooperated with the government’s
investigation, while the anecdotes below, notably, do not reflect such a downward
adjustment.
117
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., VCU Health System Authority Agrees to $4
Million Settlement (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/vcu-health-
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Even some of those resolutions, however, make it clear that DOJ lacks a policy
for calculating multipliers based on the facts of a specific case. In one of those
resolutions, the U.S. Attorney noted that the 1.5 multiplier was given because of the
defendant’s self-disclosure and remedial measures and that otherwise, “the False
Claims Act typically imposes liability for 3 times the amount of loss suffered by the
government”—a statement at odds with my analysis finding no multipliers above
2.75, and only eleven above 2.0.118 Similarly, in May 2019, the Principal Deputy
Associate Attorney General trumpeted a March 2019 resolution in which a
defendant was given what she referred to as a “discounted damages multiple of 1.7”
as evidence that companies can benefit from cooperation.119 It seems unlikely DOJ
would have highlighted that “discount” if they understood it to have been a reduction
of only 0.08 below the mean multiplier as a “credit” for “shar[ing] the results of its
extensive internal investigation and also help[ing] the government assess its losses
by developing a damages model.” 120
At the same time, there were at least as many instances of defendants receiving
above-mean 2.0 multipliers despite clear evidence of substantial cooperation,
including references to the defendant’s cooperation in some of the CSAs and DOJ
press releases.
As one clear example, a DOJ press release from February 2019 noted a
defendant “discovered non-compliance problems internally. To their credit, they
took corrective action, and they came forward to voluntarily disclose to the
Government what had occurred.”121 But while the U.S. Attorney announcing the
resolution went so far as to say that “[the defendant’s] proactive approach in [the]
case sets a good example for other providers who might find themselves facing
similar issues,” DOJ required the entity to pay a 2.0 multiplier—higher than the
mean multiplier of 1.78.122

system-authority-agrees-4-million-settlement
[https://perma.cc/CU78-45PD];
Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Ambulance Provider and Hospital Agree to Pay $1,425,000 to
Settle Ambulance Transportation Claims (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usaome/pr/ambulance-provider-and-hospital-agree-pay-1425000-settle-ambulance-transportat
ion-claims [https://perma.cc/FF2Z-RTFT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Otsego Home
Health Care Company to Pay More than $700,000 to Resolve False Claims Act Liability
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/otsego-home-health-care-companypay-more-700000-resolve-false-claims-act-liability [https://perma.cc/P684-DUUH]; U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company, supra note 54; see also infra Appendix 1.
118
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Medical Equipment Company, supra note 54.
119
McCusker Murray, supra note 78.
120
Id.
121
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Dynamic Therapy Services, LLC and
PhysioHealth, Inc. to Pay $2 Million to Resolve Allegations of Improperly Billing TRICARE
for Services Provided by Non-Authorized Providers (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov
/usao-edpa/pr/dynamic-therapy-services-llc-and-physiohealth-inc-pay-2-million-resolveallegations [https://perma.cc/KG3T-XUZ7].
122
Id.
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In another example, a DOJ press release from May 2018 noted the defendant
“cooperated fully with [the] investigation,” while the resolution required the entity
again to pay a 2.0 multiplier.123 In another, a Civil Settlement Agreement stated the
defendant “cooperated with the government throughout its investigation,” with the
resolution again requiring the entity to pay a 2.0 multiplier.124 In another, a DOJ
press release from February 2019 stated the defendant “replaced the majority of its
executive team [which would constitute a substantial remedial measure], conducted
an internal investigation, and voluntarily disclosed significant amounts of
information . . .” while the resolution required the entity to pay a 1.89 multiplier—
again higher than the mean multiplier of 1.78.125 Similarly, a DOJ press release
announcing a resolution with a 1.79 multiplier praised the defendant company,
stating “When violations are discovered, corporations should seek to immediately
cooperate and resolve the allegations and minimize future risks, as [the defendant]
has done here.”126
In numerous other cases, defendants who received above-mean multipliers
claimed in press releases or in statements to media that they had cooperated with the
government’s investigation, instituted remedial measures, or otherwise engaged in
compliant behaviors.127 In one of those cases, the company receiving a 2.0 multiplier
123

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces $6.6 Million
Settlement Against CityMD for Submitting False Claims to Medicare (May 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-66-million-settle
ment-against-citymd-submitting-false [https://perma.cc/5RSV-35F3]; Stipulation and Order
of Settlement and Dismissal at 4, United States ex rel. Bevilacqua v. City Practice Group of
New York, LLC, et al., No. 14 Civ. 9933 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1060246/download [https://perma.cc
/Q75R-FZAW].
124
Federal Settlement Agreement at 4, United States ex rel. Cretaro-Williams v.
Dermatology Associates of Central New York, PLCC, et al., No. 15-cv-00315-TJM-ATB,
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/press-release/file/1117066/
download [https://perma.cc/7KSW-SRXT].
125
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Union General Hospital to Pay $5 Million to
Resolve Alleged False Claims Act Violations (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usaondga/pr/union-general-hospital-pay-5-million-resolve-alleged-false-claims-act-violations
[https://perma.cc/Q5GE-V4CB]; see infra Appendixes 1–3.
126
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Skilled Nursing Facility Management Company
Agrees to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Feb. 5, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/usaomdtn/pr/skilled-nursing-facility-management-company-agrees-settle-false-claims-act-alleg
ations [https://perma.cc/3GQ6-B9M9]; see infra Appendixes 1–3.
127
See, e.g., Aaron Leibowitz, Target to Pay $3M Over Unauthorized Pill Refills in
Mass., LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1110201
[https://perma.cc/ZLH8-9WVK]; Madisson Haynes, HyperHeal to Pay over $400,000 for
Unnecessary Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy, WUSA9 (May 31, 2019, 8:56 PM),
https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/maryland/hyperheal-to-pay-over-400000-forunnecessary-hyperbaric-oxygen-therapy/65-80c51bba-604e-4a2a-bc24-2454dfc1bf32
[https://perma.cc/ME2F-54GQ]; Genesis Must Pay $1.88 Million to Settle Medicare OverPayment Allegations, WQAD8 (Mar. 27, 2018, 8:28 PM), https://wqad.com/2018/03/27/
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stated that the wrongdoing “was brought to our attention, fully investigated and
voluntarily reported to government authorities. . . . We have been fully cooperative
with the government in the resolution of this matter, and have taken appropriate
measures to correct these issues moving forward.”128
This information appears at odds with DOJ’s public position on the effects of
defendants’ cooperation on the settlement terms in FCA cases. Although the sample
size is small, the results of my analysis are suggestive. At least without further
information, it is difficult to square these results with the message of the FCA
Guidance.
At the same time, several defendants received multipliers below 2.0 despite
clear evidence that they did not even accept responsibility—never mind provide
cooperation—regarding the alleged wrongdoing, and where there was no visible
evidence of compliant behavior. Several of the defendants who received multipliers
of 1.0—solely paying restitution without any additional payment to even cover the
lost interest, cost of investigation, or relator’s share, all of which must be taken into
account under the FCA Guidance—affirmatively denied they had violated the False
Claims Act.129
genesis-must-pay-1-88-million-to-settle-claims-that-it-overbilled-patients/ [https://perma.
cc/3CYU-J752]; Rehab Center, Founders Agree to $1.3M Settlement in False Claims Case,
NEW HAVEN REG. (Apr. 27, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Reh
ab-center-founders-agree-to-1-3M-settlement-12869106.php
[https://perma.cc/3WXLFVUV]; John Commins, Michigan Hospital to Pay $84.5M to Settle Stark Law, Kickback
Claims, HEALTHLEADERS (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/clinicalcare/michigan-hospital-pay-845m-settle-stark-law-kickback-claims [https://perma.cc/V6PT
-3RGL]; News Release, Beaumont, Beaumont Health Resolves Longstanding Investigation,
Looks to Future (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.beaumont.org/health-wellness/pressreleases/beaumont-health-resolves-longstanding-investigation-looks-to-future [https://per
ma.cc/6DPF-AZZV]; Press Release, Medtronic, Medtronic Statement Regarding Recent
DOJ Announcement (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.medtronic.com/us-en/about/news/mediaresources/medtronic-statement-regarding-doj.html;
[https://perma.cc/5CNU-W6UD];
Susannah Luthi, MedStar Pays $35 Million in False Claims Act Settlement, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:59 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/lawregulation/medstar-pays-35-million-false-claims-act-settlement
[https://perma.cc/764RBN9B]; John Commins, CareWell Urgent Care to Pay $2M to Resolve Upcoding
Allegations, HEALTHLEADERS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/care
well-urgent-care-pay-2m-resolve-upcoding-allegations [https://perma.cc/4N2E-7BQ9]; see
infra Appendixes 1–3.
128
Amye Anderson, Livingston Hospital Agrees to Settle False Claims Act Allegations,
UPPER CUMBERLAND BUS. J. (June 21, 2018), https://www.ucbjournal.com/livingstonhospital-agrees-to-settle-false-claims-act-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/SN67-W546].
129
See, e.g., Ayla Ellison, Specialty Pharmacy Pays $17M to Settle Medicare Billing
Fraud Suit, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com
/legal-regulatory-issues/specialty-pharmacy-pays-17m-to-settle-medicare-billing-fraud-law
suit.html [https://perma.cc/D5QX-RUQV]; Marty Stempniak, Vanguard Healthcare Will
Pay $18M to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, MCKNIGHT’S LONG-TERM CARE NEWS
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.mcknights.com/news/vanguard-healthcare-will-pay-18m-to-
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That is not necessarily to say the first group did not receive adequate credit for
their cooperation—it is theoretically possible those multipliers would have been
above 2.0 if not for their cooperation—or that there were no other reasons for the
second group to receive below 2.0 multipliers. Due to the lack of DOJ transparency,
it is not possible to know whether DOJ disagreed with these defendants’ claims of
engaging in compliant behaviors.
As discussed below, the lack of transparency is no less a problem than the
apparent lack of consistency. If these resolutions do reflect a consistent rationale for
determining multipliers in individual cases, including true cooperation or acceptance
of responsibility benefit, the lack of transparency necessarily means they fail to
adequately inform industry and the defense bar of the existence and extent of those
benefits.
It was also notable that while there were some examples where DOJ noted a
company’s self-disclosure or cooperation, I did not find a single instance of DOJ
even claiming to credit a company’s pre-existing compliance program in
determining the appropriate resolution of an FCA case. If this is reflective of DOJ
not properly valuing the existence of a compliance program (and its lack of
meaningful inclusion in the FCA Guidance was not inadvertent), that would be
troubling, as it is the one compliant behavior aimed directly at stopping fraud before
it occurs.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Comparison of the criminal and civil schemes for resolving cases, particularly
in conjunction with data analysis and anecdotal evidence, raises several issues and
suggests there are structural problems with DOJ’s handling of FCA resolutions.
Notable amongst those issues are: DOJ’s failure to utilize the top end of FCA
exposure; over-incentivizing settlement and under-incentivizing acceptance of
responsibility; and the lack of sufficiently detailed guidance and transparency to
create appropriate uniformity across DOJ components and appropriately incentivize
industry.

settle-false-claims-act-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/AHE3-GA7Z]; Chris Marr, Florida
Skin Doctor to Pay $4M over Cancer Therapy Claims, BL (Aug. 28, 2018, 2:53 PM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XFVU0DN0000000?criteria_id=
a5649626283db2910425c258bf393b36&searchGuid=43e452c2-e2ee-4665-a92c-6613ce01
c00d [https://perma.cc/H5Q8-6TE2].
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 4-4.112, (“The maximum credit that a
defendant may earn may not exceed an amount that would result in the government receiving
less than full compensation for the losses caused by the defendant’s misconduct (including
the government’s damages, lost interest, costs of investigation, and relator share.”).
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A. DOJ’s Failure to Utilize the Top End of FCA Exposure & Adequately Deter
Corporate Health Care Fraud
The data calls into question whether DOJ is applying multipliers in a manner
that maximizes deterrence and incentivizes compliant behavior. While treble
damages plus penalties are available under the statute, the data makes clear that no
one—neither the Commercial Litigation Branch nor any individual U.S. Attorney’s
Offices—is requiring even close to treble damages, never mind penalties, when
resolving FCA cases through settlement.
DOJ made no use of the top end of potential FCA exposure in cases between
early 2018 and June 2019—not only did none of the eighty-nine resolutions involve
the imposition of penalties, but none had a multiplier higher than 2.75, only three
were above 2.5, and only eleven above 2.0. For all of DOJ’s statements about the
power of the FCA to recover government money and deter fraud, the data calls into
question whether, in many cases, DOJ’s FCA resolutions accomplish either goal
given the substantial incentives apparently being offered to defendants for settling
their cases.
Commentators have debated the appropriate FCA multiplier for achieving
general deterrence, but none have suggested a multiplier as low as seen in the data
would achieve DOJ’s deterrence objectives.130 The debate has generally centered
around whether the goal should be complete or optimal deterrence. Optimal
deterrence is defined as calculating a penalty to compel a wrongdoer to fully
internalize a victim’s loss, including taking into account the likelihood that the
wrongdoer might not have been discovered and that the victim might not take action
because of the costs of investigation and prosecution, among other things.131
Complete deterrence is defined as calculating a penalty to equal or exceed any
potential gain to the wrongdoer from the wrongful conduct, taking into account the
likelihood that the wrongdoer might not have been caught and held liable for the
conduct.132
Some commentators have focused on the broader question of whether civil
sanctions should be viewed as tools to compensate injuries and to “price”
misconduct, rather than “prohibit” violations.133 DOJ has regularly rejected the idea
that health care fraud settlements are solely a “cost of doing business.”134 In the FCA
130

See, e.g., Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 279–80.
See id. at 266.
132
Id. at 268.
133
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1538–51
(1984); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models – And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876–77 (1992).
134
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Respironics to Pay $34.8 Million for
Allegedly Causing False Claims to Medicare, Medicaid and Tricare Related to the Sale of
Masks Designed to Treat Sleep Apnea (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/resp
ironics-pay-348-million-allegedly-causing-false-claims-medicare-medicaid-and-tricare
[https://perma.cc/S3LZ-BGU6] (“We hope that those who commit fraud will recognize that
131
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context, DOJ has claimed to utilize civil sanctions in a manner not meaningfully
distinguishable from criminal sanctions—using consequences not only to take away
any financial reward for engaging in health care fraud but to prevent the conduct
completely.135
Timothy Jost and Sharon Davies examined this debate at length, concluding
that “[b]ecause the level of auditing and enforcement in federal health care programs
is very low, deterrence theory would seem to dictate that penalties imposed on
providers who are found liable for fraud and abuse must be set very high before even
optimal deterrence is achieved.”136 As a result, Jost and Davies took the position that
in some cases, even treble damages and penalties are likely “too mild rather than too
severe” and that “[t]o settle false claims cases routinely for significantly less ‘than
the legally authorized penalties’ is to undermine even optimal deterrence and to risk
encouraging improper billing.”137
As noted above,138 a large number of FCA settlements recovered no more—and
often less—than the amount of damages plus interest. No complex analysis of
economic incentives is necessary to conclude that such settlements do exactly what
Jost and Davies warned against.139
Even putting deterrence aside, the gap between potential treble damages and
penalties on the high end and single damages on the low end provides DOJ with an
opportunity to offer meaningful rewards for compliant behaviors, and presumably
to also take into account other factors laid out in both the FCA Guidance and the
Corporate Prosecution Guidelines (e.g. “the nature and seriousness of the violation,
the scope of the violation . . . the defendant’s history of recidivism, the harm or risk
of harm from the violation . . . .”).140 But DOJ has, in practice, greatly narrowed that
gap and limited its ability to meaningfully reward compliant behaviors among
settling defendants.

it is our goal to make the consequences more than just the cost of doing business.” (quotation
omitted)); Fighting Fraud and Waste in Medicare and Medicaid: Spec. Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 35 (2011) (testimony of Tony West,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Div., Dep’t of Just.) (arguing that “[i]t cannot be that a company
sees healthcare enforcement, law enforcement, imposing a fine as a cost of doing business.”).
135
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 2018, supra note 41. See also
Coffee, supra note 133, at 1876–77.
136
Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 279.
137
Id. at 280, 308.
138
See supra Section III.C.
139
See Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 308. While it is true that the settlement figure is
not the only cost to defendants, and collateral costs may be substantial—costs of
investigation, defense, remediation, and in some cases a Corporate Integrity Agreement
(“CIA”) with HHS-OIG—those costs (other than a CIA) are likely to apply regardless of
whether the investigation discovers wrongdoing, thus eliminating its deterrent value, and
there is no evidence in the data that DOJ used the existence of any such costs as a rationale
for reducing the required multiplier.
140
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 53, § 4-4.120; Corporate
Prosecution Principles, supra note 4.
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B. Under-Incentivizing Compliant Behaviors & Over-Incentivizing Settlement
Given that DOJ does seek treble damages and penalties in the rare case when
an FCA case goes to trial or is resolved on summary judgment, the results represent
an enormous benefit for the simple act of settling. DOJ has provided a far greater
benefit to defendants for resolving cases in the FCA context—even with defendants
who rarely accept responsibility, and in many cases, affirmatively deny
responsibility—than in the criminal context, where the act of pleading guilty brings
with it an actual acceptance of responsibility.
Even if there is a benefit for compliant behaviors and acceptance of
responsibility, they are dwarfed by the credit given for the simple act of settling.
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the reduction for a defendant organization’s
self-disclosure is five times the reduction for mere acceptance of responsibility, and
the reductions for cooperation or for having had an effective compliance and ethics
program in place are two times and three times the acceptance of responsibility
deduction, respectively. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines multiplier reduction for
acceptance of responsibility is only 0.2-0.4—smaller than adjustments based on the
size of the organization, and the role in the organization of the responsible
individuals.141 In the FCA context, where penalties are regularly more than the
amount of the damages for each claim, it can conservatively be said that the
government’s forgoing of penalties and reduction of the FCA multiplier at or below
2.0 is a reduction of 2.0—five to ten times the reduction given in criminal cases.
Over-incentivizing settlement carries with it two powerful risks—the risk of
under-deterrence in cases of true wrongdoing (addressed above with regard to DOJ’s
failure to utilize the top end of FCA exposure), and the risk of coerced settlements
where defendants have not engaged in wrongdoing. While Jost and Davies’s analysis
of optimal deterrence theory and the FCA concluded that the latter was a more
substantial problem, they noted the former was a primary grievance of industry.142
For decades, industry and defense counsel have complained that the magnitude of
FCA exposure creates an environment where defendants are vulnerable to “unfair
and abusive” settlements.143 Jost and Davies listed “coerced settlements” as one of
the top “grievances” of FCA defendants, noting industry claims of “extortionate
settlements.”144 Joan Krause took issue with Jost and Davies’ dismissal of such
concerns, arguing that Jost and Davies failed to account for cases where defendants
lack the requisite intent for liability under the FCA but might be deterred from
challenging the government’s claims given the risk of an FCA judgment of trebles
and penalties.145 Krause expressed concern that the FCA structure was potentially
141

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 (2018).
Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at 258, 310–11.
143
Id. at 258.
144
Id. at 264–65.
145
Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 207–08 (2001).
142
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leading to coerced settlements—a concern that would surely be heightened by the
newly revealed data.
Until now, the debate surrounding potentially coercive FCA resolutions and the
appropriate settlement discount has taken place essentially in the dark, with no
visibility as to how DOJ has resolved cases.146 While the data provides even more
reason for concern in this area—both for Jost and Davies’s concern regarding underdeterrence and Krause’s concern regarding coerced settlements—it also enables for
the first time a conversation about the appropriate calculations grounded in reality
rather than an abstraction.
Transparency will also allow for a public discussion of the appropriate standard
multiplier to achieve deterrence, the magnitude of compliant behavior credit and the
settling benefit, and whether, as some in industry and the defense bar have argued,
it is so large as to force defendants to settle even if they strongly feel they did not
engage in wrongdoing.147
If a settling benefit of this magnitude is truly DOJ’s intention, transparency will
benefit DOJ by setting clear expectations for defendants. It would also do much to
counter skepticism amongst industry and the defense bar that meaningful credit for
compliant behaviors is actually given. As is described above, there are many
146

Jost and Davies speculated that at least some U.S. Attorneys had settled FCA cases
for far less than treble damages plus penalties, but were limited to only a few anecdotes. “A
report of another recent settlement quoted a U.S. Attorney as stating that the case was settled
by applying a multiplier of 2.1 to 2.5 times actual damages to reach the settlement, suggesting
that at least some U.S. Attorneys have devised approaches to settling FCA cases for amounts
far below the penalties legally available under the FCA.” Jost & Davies, supra note 38, at
306 n.353 (referencing Fraud and Abuse: Baltimore Hospital to Pay $827,000 to Settle
Medicare Fraud Allegations, HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (BNA) (June 15, 1998) at d7,
available in WL 6/15/98 HCD d7).
147
See Krause, supra note 145, at 204 (citing Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn
Anyone into a Crook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2000, at A18); Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare
Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in
the War Against Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 114 (1999) (arguing
that FCA’s “threat of draconian . . . sanctions coerces providers into settlements regarding
issues on which providers would likely prevail”); John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why
Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51
ALA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1999) (arguing penalty structure “places great pressure on defendants to
settle even meritless suits”); Thomas S. Crane, Health Care, Defense Industry Must Regroup
Efforts to Reform False Claims Act, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 1, 2 (Apr. 21, 1999)
(arguing FCA penalties are among “the most abused tools in the government’s arsenal to
leverage exorbitant settlements”); William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 JAMA
1179, 1180 (1999) (noting “large organizations have such a large stake in avoiding exclusion
from Medicare that they readily settle pending charges, making much of fraud control
resemble a rebate program more than a law enforcement exercise.”); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7 (discussing the potential for HHS-OIG exclusion, which, in addition the the FCA
damages consequences, puts enormous pressure on defendant companies to resolve cases
amicably).
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anecdotal examples of defendant companies who received above-mean multipliers
despite having claimed in statements to the media or press releases that they had
cooperated with the government’s investigation, instituted remedial measures, or
otherwise engaged in compliant behaviors.148 With the lack of a calculation structure
forcing industry and the defense bar to look to each resolution announcement to
understand DOJ’s analysis, such examples fit neatly with the narrative of some that
DOJ does not provide the benefits it claims.149 But it may be the case that DOJ
disagrees that those entities provided cooperation in the investigation or otherwise
engaged in compliant behaviors, or that other factors pushed those multipliers higher
despite compliant behavior reductions. Transparency as to calculations would
eliminate that basis for skepticism.
C. Under-Incentivizing Acceptance of Responsibility
To the extent FCA settlements are viewed as the result of prosecutorial coercion
(rather than wrongdoing) or as nothing more than the cost of doing business for
health care entities, DOJ’s credibility and perceived legitimacy are put at risk.
As Joan Krause has written, “[t]he industry’s distrust of FCA enforcement has
important implications for the future of the health care anti-fraud agenda.”150 Krause
focused on the question of whether DOJ was using the FCA to obtain settlements in
cases where the conduct was not worthy of DOJ enforcement and noted the risk that
industry would view DOJ enforcement under the FCA as inconsistently applied,
potentially interfering with effective crime control.151 Krause pointed to theorists
regarding the importance of “perceived legitimacy and moral credibility of the law”
and argued:
[I]f health care providers come to believe that the law is being applied
unfairly—that federal prosecutors are pursuing inappropriate cases,
148

See sources cited supra note 127. These more than half dozen examples of defendant
companies received above-mean multipliers despite having claimed in statements to the
media or in press releases that they had cooperated with the government’s investigation,
instituted remedial measures, or otherwise engaged in compliant behaviors.
149
See, e.g., Rebecca Martin & Sarah Walters, Updated Yates Memo Still Has Force in
Civil Domain, LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2018, 11:20 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1111
279/updated-yates-memo-still-has-force-in-civil-domain
[https://perma.cc/9JJ7-PD6U].
This article by McDermott, Will & Emery attorneys, one of whom previously worked for
DOJ, notes that there is an “enduring mystery about what ‘credit’ actually means in a
practical, dollars-and-cents way” and that “the Yates Memo left practitioners scratching their
heads regarding how the government actually quantifies ‘cooperation credit’ in FCA
matters,” moving forward. Id.
150
Krause, supra note 145, at 127.
151
Id. at 207–08 (“[L]egitimate providers whose activities fall within a regulatory gray
area might well be more likely to fear the untoward effects of a fraud suit, and hence more
likely to settle.”).
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hoping defendants will settle rather than take their chances at trial—the
legitimacy of the government’s anti-fraud efforts may be questioned.
Doubt as to the legitimacy of the government’s efforts would likely lead
to further industry non-compliance . . . .152
While Krause focused on her concern regarding “potentially staggering civil
liability under the FCA”153 and potential over-prosecution by DOJ—analysis of the
now-available data raises an additional reason for worry regarding perception of
legitimacy—DOJ has substantially rewarded settlement while being seemingly
indifferent to actual acceptance of responsibility. With few exceptions, the FCA
settlements examined did not include any admissions from the defendants and
included language in the CSAs that “[t]o avoid the delay, uncertainty,
inconvenience, and expense of protracted litigation of the above claims, and in
consideration of the mutual promises and obligations of this Settlement Agreement,
the Parties agree and covenant . . . .”154 Consistent with the CSAs, virtually all of the
DOJ press releases announcing the FCA settlements included language to the effect
that “[t]he [civil] claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only, and there
has been no determination of liability.”155
DOJ’s policy of allowing companies to obtain the substantial settlement benefit
in FCA cases while actively denying wrongdoing is, on its face, even more
problematic than the much-maligned “neither admit nor deny” language, which is
common in Securities and Exchange Commission resolutions. The SEC adopted the
no-admit/no-deny policy itself out of concern that defendant denials would create
“an impression that a [resolution was being entered into] when the conduct alleged
did not, in fact, occur.”156 No-admit/no-deny has been criticized by courts and
scholars because of its lack of admissions, leading to a change in SEC policy in 2013
to require admissions in some cases.157 But DOJ currently does not even go so far as
152

Id. at 127–28 (citing PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 202 (1995)).
153

LIABILITY,

Krause, supra note 145, at 216.
See, e.g., Federal Settlement Agreement at 4, United States ex rel. Cretaro-Williams
v. Dermatology Associates of Central New York, PLCC, et al., No. 15-cv-00315-TJM-ATB,
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/press-release/file/1117066/
download [https://perma.cc/7KSW-SRXT].
155
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Skilled Nursing Facility, supra note 126; U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Union General Hospital, supra note 125.
156
See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2018).
157
See, e.g., SEC. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F.Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F.Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Rakoff,
J.) (criticizing the SEC’s former admissions policy because it deprives courts of assurance
that the relief they are asked to impose has any basis in fact). While there is debate regarding
the impact of the 2013 policy change, there is a striking difference in the attention paid to
the debate over admissions in the context of SEC resolutions as compared to FCA
settlements. See David Rosenfeld, Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases: The Revolution
that Wasn’t, 103 IOWA L. REV. 113, 122–26 (2017) (noting SEC’s 2013 change in policy and
154
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forbidding defendants from denying wrongdoing when resolving most FCA cases.
This DOJ policy, too, fuels industry skepticism regarding the legitimacy of
settlements and similarly weakens DOJ’s efforts at general deterrence.158
Because FCA settlements have, in almost all cases, done nothing to prevent
defendants from making public statements proclaiming their innocence, companies
have publicly claimed their settlements were coerced and illegitimate.159 As noted
above,160 several of the defendants who received multipliers of 1.0—solely paying
restitution without any additional payment to even cover the lost interest, cost of
investigation, or relator’s share, all of which must be taken into account under the
FCA Guidance—affirmatively denied they had violated the False Claims Act.161
Both from a deterrence perspective and a legitimacy perspective, Congress and DOJ
have recognized the harm which results from industry sentiment that FCA
settlements are simply a cost of doing business, and have sought to push back on
that view.162
D. Lack of Sufficiently Detailed Guidance & Transparency
Issuance of the FCA Guidance has sharpened the focus on how reductions from
FCA multipliers are determined, but at the heart of the problem is a lack of guidance
as to how multipliers should be determined in the absence of compliant behaviors.
The data demonstrates that this has resulted in a lack of uniformity across the
country, with U.S. Attorney’s Offices—whether intentionally or unintentionally—
seemingly calculating resolutions differently when the Commercial Litigation
Branch is not involved. As DOJ has noted, consistency among prosecutors is critical
to perceptions of fairness and is best accomplished through transparency—an
important tool not only externally—to guide industry and the defense bar—but also
internally, to ensure prosecutors are acting predictably. 163
questioning its impact).
158
Ayla Ellison, Identifying Trends in False Claims Act Enforcement, BECKER’S HOSP.
REV. (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatoryissues/identify-trends-in-false-claims-act-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/4P64-YHAJ]
(“For some in the healthcare industry, civil settlements are treated more like a cost of doing
business than a true deterrent to fraudulent conduct.” (quoting Shannon DeBra)).
159
Robert Holly, Encompass Health to Pay $48M to Settle False Claims Allegations,
HOME HEALTH CARE NEWS (July 1, 2019), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2019/07/encom
pass-health-to-pay-48m-to-settle-false-claims-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/KH6J-B8HT]
(“‘The evidence establishes that Encompass Health did nothing wrong,’ [Mark Tarr,
president and CEO of Encompass Health] said in a statement. ‘But to stop this interminable
investigation and avoid further expense, we decided it is in the best interests of Encompass
Health and its shareholders to settle with DOJ and end the related litigation.’”).
160
See supra Section III.F.
161
See, e.g., Ellison, supra note 129; Stempniak, supra note 129; Marr, supra note 129.
162
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Respironics to Pay $34.8 Million, supra note 134.
163
See Global Investigations Review Live, supra note 12 (“Internally, at the Department
of Justice, transparency helps define and refine the criteria prosecutors will apply to key
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The potential that the qui tam system incentivizes U.S. Attorney’s Offices to
behave differently than the Commercial Litigation Branch, and may incentivize U.S.
Attorney’s Offices, in particular, to inadequately provide compliant behavior
benefits, further demonstrates the need for a defined multiplier calculation structure.
DOJ’s recent efforts to incentivize compliant behaviors through the
transparency of the FCA Guidance cannot achieve its desired effect in its current
state. The FCA Guidance laid out publicly, for the first time, the factors that might
warrant a reduction in a multiplier, but it lacks specificity as to how such reductions
should apply. And while the FCA Guidance notes that DOJ may “publicly
acknowledge the entity’s [] disclosure, other cooperation, or remediation” as an
“additional avenue[] that would permit an entity [] to claim credit in FCA cases,”
without a policy of showing its work—laying out multiplier calculations in CSAs as
they are in criminal resolution documents—industry and the defense bar have no
means by which to judge the extent of the benefit received even where DOJ
acknowledges compliant behaviors.
At a minimum, the analysis makes clear that if DOJ wishes to achieve its oftstated goal of incentivizing business organization cooperation and investments in
compliance programs, DOJ must increase the level of transparency and guidance—
a fact DOJ has clearly understood when it comes to motivating compliant behaviors,
self-disclosure in particular, in the context of the FCPA and other criminal
prosecutions.164 With the criminal-side trend towards increased transparency and
defined benefits evident in the Corporate Enforcement Policy, the transparency gap
between criminal and civil has been thrown into sharp relief.
Criminal DOJ officials have spoken explicitly about the need for transparency
in resolutions in order to overcome industry skepticism. In a December 2019
interview with the Wall Street Journal, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
overseeing DOJ’s Criminal Division pointed to transparency as DOJ’s mechanism
to show industry that DOJ is following its own guidance—“if we don’t do that, the
policies will ring hollow.”165 That is precisely the risk facing DOJ’s FCA
enforcement.

decisions. . . . Having internal guidance that is both clear and clearly memorialized helps to
ensure consistency and predictability in how those standards are applied within the
Department.”).
164
See generally Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate
Transnational Bribery Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683 (2015) (arguing, prior to issuance
of the FCPA Pilot Program, that the government should be more transparent regarding
specific and calculable benefits that can be achieved through self-reporting and cooperation
in the face of FCPA violations).
165
Dylan Tokar, How the Justice Department Incentivizes Companies to Invest in
Compliance, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-thejustice-department-incentivizes-companies-to-invest-in-compliance-11577183403
[https://perma.cc/6QDD-N6XB].
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CONCLUSION
With changes in the tax law providing a glimpse into DOJ’s handling of FCA
settlements at the same time as DOJ’s criminal prosecutors have moved aggressively
and publicly towards increased transparency in rewarding compliant behaviors,
DOJ’s corporate enforcement is at a crossroads—DOJ must either increase the
structure and transparency surrounding its handling of FCA matters or risk a further
decline in industry trust in the fairness of DOJ policy. By documenting and applying
a structure to the calculation of FCA settlements, DOJ has the opportunity to
improve the relationship between DOJ and industry and create deterrence far beyond
what can be achieved through individual enforcement actions. Without change in
this area, DOJ risks undercutting its efforts at encouraging compliant behavior in
one of DOJ’s primary enforcement areas.
To the extent DOJ is already appropriately rewarding compliant behavior in
civil FCA resolutions, adopting such a framework and including the math in public
settlement agreements would come at no cost and would provide assurance of
consistency among cases handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country.
Revealing restitution figures while making no further comment on calculation
methodology, however, will continue to lead to speculation and misinformation.
Instead, DOJ should take the opportunity to reexamine its approach, both to how it
calculates FCA settlements internally and as to its historic unwillingness to be
transparent about its calculations. By adopting a structure of calculating the
appropriate amount of civil settlements modeled, in general terms, on U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines § 8C (including increases based on the severity of the
misconduct and the level of those involved, and decreases based on compliant
behavior and acceptance of responsibility, among other factors), DOJ can
incentivize compliant behavior while also taking the opportunity to explain
settlements to the public and industry.
DOJ is likely to be resistant to such a change not only because of institutional
inertia but possibly also because of some of the same issues which have caused
critics to question DOJ’s use of the FCA—the currently large settlement benefit
creates enormous pressure on defendants to settle. The lack of transparency allows
the government to reduce settlement demands based on litigation risk without doing
so explicitly and being forced to acknowledge publicly when it sees weaknesses in
its litigation position.166 But none of these grounds are a reason to avoid what would
be a positive development, and DOJ has never publicly stated why it has avoided
providing this information. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8C framework
reduces fines by 20–40% based on acceptance of responsibility, and those
percentages could be increased with regard to civil matters if that is viewed as
166

Litigation risk might explain some of the resolutions with low multipliers where the
evidence points away from there having been compliant behavior. Litigation risk as a silent
factor would not explain the overall distribution of multipliers, however, as one would expect
to see more resolutions with higher multipliers in cases without significant litigation risk.
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desirable (as DOJ has done with cooperation and self-disclosure in the context of
the Corporate Enforcement Policy on the criminal side). And an ideal calculation
structure would allow for sufficient flexibility to permit consideration of litigation
risk, just as the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8C framework leads to a range with a
maximum twice its minimum, and looks to a series of more amorphous factors to
determine a specific fine within that range, or even beyond it in unusual cases.167
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the Corporate Enforcement Policy have not
forsaken all art in the name of science, but provide sufficient transparency to allow
both for discussion of the merits of various additions and reductions and to allow
industry to engage in some calculation of risks and benefits.
If, on the other hand, DOJ is resistant because it has not been rewarding
compliant behavior in resolving civil FCA cases, a change in this area is even more
important. Doing so would constitute a short-term view—prioritizing short-term
dollar recoveries (and press releases) over broad, long-term deterrence. Through an
appropriate calculation methodology for FCA matters, DOJ can rectify the lack of
appropriate incentives for compliant behavior currently present in the health care
industry. Through transparency, DOJ can create a framework for an appropriate
dialogue regarding the appropriate level at which compliant behavior should be
rewarded, and the lack of compliant behavior should be punished.

167

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8 (2004) (includes factors that the
court is required to consider under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3572(a), in addition to other
factors).
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APPENDIX 1
HEALTH CARE FCA SETTLEMENTS
All
Involved CLB
USAO-only

All
118
44 (37%)
74 (63%)

Multiplier ID’d
89
36 (40%)
453 (60%)

Qui Tam
No Qui Tam

77 (65%)
41 (35%)

55 (62%)
34 (38%)

Mean Multiplier168

n/a

1.78 (0.45)

Multiplier > 2.0
Multiplier = 2.0169
Multiplier < 2.0
Multiplier ≤ 1.5170

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

11
44
34
26

Q1
Median
Q3

n/a
n/a
n/a

1.5
2.0
2.0

APPENDIX 2
RESOLUTIONS INVOLVING CLB VS. USAO-ONLY (MULTIPLIER ID’D)
Multiplier ID’d
Mean Resolution
Mean for Multiplier ID’d171
Variance
p value172

168

Involved CLB
36 (40%)
$34,857,974
1.66 (0.458)
0.21
0.037*

USAO-only
53 (60%)
$7,404,954
1.86 (0.429)
0.18

Value in parentheses is standard deviation.
Multipliers were rounded to the nearest tenth for purposes of categorization. Thus,
any multiplier below 2.05 but greater than or equal to 1.95 was considered 2.0 for purposes
of categorization.
170
Multipliers were rounded to the nearest tenth for purposes of categorization. Thus,
any multiplier below 1.55 but greater than or equal to 1.45 was considered 1.5 for purposes
of categorization.
171
Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
172
Significant at 5% level.
169
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APPENDIX 3
USAO-ONLY RESOLUTIONS: QUI TAM VS. NO QUI TAM (MULTIPLIER ID’D)
Multiplier ID’d
Mean Resolution
Mean for Multiplier ID’d173
Variance
p value174

173
174

No Qui Tam
22
$3,667,780
1.74 (0.453)
0.20
0.069

Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
Significant at 10% level.

Qui Tam
31
$10,057,142
1.95 (0.394)
0.15

